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exports to the US. But this performance has not been accompanied by some of the more dynamic growth
benefits that might have been hoped for. In this study we develop the theory and present empirical
evidence to demonstrate that these outcomes are the predictable consequences of the manner in which
the specific preferences might be expected to work.
The MFA (Multi-fiber Arrangement) quotas on US imports of textiles created a favorable environment
for low value-added, fabric-intensive clothing production in countries with unused quotas by inducing
constrained countries to move into higher quality products.  By allowing the least developed African
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other rules of origin in preventing poor countries from taking advantage of other preference programs.
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But the disappointments can also be attributed to the preferences because they discouraged additional
value-addition in assembly and stimulated the use of expensive fabrics that were unlikely to be produced
locally. When the MFA was removed, constrained countries such as China moved strongly into precisely
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MFN reductions in US clothing tariffs could similarly have particularly severe adverse effects on these
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AGOA Rules: The intended and unintended consequences of Special 
Fabric Provisions. 
 
Introduction 
The export performance of the small, land-locked nation of Lesotho is an 
African success story that demonstrates both the power and limitations of trade 
preferences. In 2004, just three years after Lesotho became eligible for preferences 
under the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) the clothing exports to the 
US from one of Africa’s poorest land-locked nations had trebled to reach $460 
million and provide employment for over 50,000 workers (Bennett, 2006). The 
performance of Lesotho and several other preference recipients was particularly 
striking because it seemed to contradict the pessimistic verdict many had reached 
about Africa’s capacity to become a globally competitive exporter of manufactured 
products even when granted preferential market access.
2  
On May 12 2010, a ceremony was held on Capitol Hill in Washington DC, to 
celebrate the tenth Anniversary of AGOA. In his remarks at the gathering, United 
States Trade Representative Ron Kirk credited AGOA with “a substantial increase in 
two-way U.S.-Africa trade since 2000, with African countries now exporting to the 
United States a more diverse range of value-added products,” Kirk also asserted that 
the trade program “powerfully demonstrates the link between trade and economic 
development.” 
3 In this paper we will provide some evidence that supports Kirk’s 
                                                 
2 Several studies have been devoted to explaining this poor performance, and most conclude that the 
problems lie with the African countries themselves, rather than on the access given their products in 
foreign markets. A host of inhibiting factors have been identified (Ng et al., 1996; Wang and Winters, 
1998).  
3 http://www.america.gov/st/business-english/2010/May/20100513122443SztiwomoD0.8958856.html  
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positive verdict:  AGOA has stimulated exports of manufactured products, especially 
clothing, but we will also suggest that the ultimate impact on economic development 
has been quite disappointing. We will argue that both the success and limitations are 
the predictable consequences of the manner in which the preferences have been 
constructed.  We will show that although these preferences encourage exports, they 
simultaneously create disincentives for local value-addition that may limit the 
program’s development benefits. 
Background 
As indicated by Mr. Kirk’s remarks, trade preferences are of interest not only 
because they might provide one time benefits in the form of higher incomes and 
increased employment but also because trade is associated with more dynamic 
benefits that lead to faster growth.  Economic growth is an ever- expanding process in 
which actors not only replicate what they were doing on greater scale but 
continuously develop new capabilities that allow them to produce increasingly 
sophisticated goods and services (Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 20007). More 
developed countries typically produce higher unit value products and wider ranges of 
products than their less-developed counterparts (Schott, 2004). These products often 
face less elastic demands and provide higher profit margins than more standardized, 
commodity-like products. If they can “learn by doing” by using trade preferences, it is 
hoped that firms that start by exporting a few simple products can upgrade their 
product sophistication, and diversify into other products and markets and ultimately 
become competitors that no longer need preferential treatment.
4 In addition, it is 
                                                 
4 According to Hwang (2007) there is unconditional convergence at the 6-digit level. If countries start 
to produce low unit-value goods within a product category, they will eventually experience significant 
increases in their unit values.  The claim is that this will happen more or less automatically, without 
any special supportive policies in place.  
 
5
5
hoped that there are benefits to the rest of the economy. Other domestic firms could 
gain too through backward and forward linkages as exporters demand inputs and 
services and become increasingly embedded in the local economy.   
During the industrial revolution this form of development was evident in the 
textile industry which was an important driver of industrialization.  Japan, and later 
Korea, Hong Kong and other dynamic Asians also all cut their teeth as exporters of 
clothing continuously upgrading, and diversifying (Gereffi, 1999). Motivated in part 
by such considerations, the EU and the US both implemented multilateral Generalized 
Special Preferences (GSP) programs in the 1970s. In addition, they both have 
regionally focused preferential programs. 
5 
Yet, the notion that developed country markets are open to manufactured 
exports from least developed economies as a result of these concessions can be 
challenged. It is difficult for underdeveloped countries to produce complete complex 
products but they are often quite capable of providing simple assembly operations.  
Some of the preferences given through programs are thus a sham because they include 
rules of origin that require more local production than these poor countries can 
provide.  These rules are generally justified as necessary to prevent the trade-
deflection that could occur if products are imported from third countries and then, 
with little additional value added, claimed as originating from preference-recipients – 
a practice sometimes known as “screwdriver plants.” This is a legitimate concern, but 
the rules are more constraining than strictly necessary and they inhibit poor countries 
                                                 
5 The EU granted African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries special preferences, first under the 
Lomé Conventions (starting in 1976) and later through the Contonou Agreement (2000). More recently 
the EU has concluded Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with groups of ACP countries. The 
US has granted special preferences under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the Andean Promotion 
Act and AGOA.  Preferences for least developed countries (LDCs) have received special attention. In 
2001, the European Union introduced an “Everything But Arms” (EBA) program which provides LDC 
exports duty free, quota-free access. In the Doha Round negotiations the United States agreed to give 
duty-free access to LDCs in 97 percent of its tariff lines.   
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from specializing in the narrow slices of global production chains in which their 
comparative advantage is likely to lie.  
In the case of preference programs in apparel, these rules are particularly 
stringent, generally requiring that at least two (in the case of the EU) or even (in the 
case of the US) three transformation processes (e.g. yarn, fabric, assembly) in the 
preference-receiving or granting countries to qualify for duty-free entry. (For an 
excellent account see Ahmad, 2007). These rules are especially problematic because 
fabric production is a highly capital and technology activity that is beyond the 
capabilities of most very poor countries. 
The rules of the US AGOA program are however an important exception, 
indeed perhaps the exception that proves the rule.  AGOA not only gave all Sub-
Saharan countries extensive duty -free quota-free access to the US (Table 1). 
6 Its 
rules of origin also contained an unusual a waiver for wearing apparel that was 
granted to “Lesser Developed Beneficiary Countries” (LDBCs). Subject to a fairly 
generous market-share caps that have not been binding, the waiver allowed these 
LDBC countries to use third-country fabrics or yarn and still export clothing under the 
AGOA preferences.
7 Instead of requiring individual items to meet specific 
transformation rules, such as minimum value-added requirements, or the use of 
domestic fabric, the US set up a simple inspection program that verified that genuine 
                                                 
6 In May 2000, the US congress passed AGOA.  The Act granted duty free access for 4600 GSP tariff-
line items plus another 1800 tariff line –items not on the original GSP. This meant that, aside from 
some apparel and agricultural products, AGOA beneficiaries could export almost any product to the US 
duty free. The AGOA preferences for garments required that that they are made of 85% US made yarn 
and fabric or from fabrics and yarns made in other AGOA beneficiary countries. 
7 Most of the countries that were eligible for the wainver are classified as Least Developed by the 
United Nations. Botswana and Namibia did not meet the requirements for the Special Rule as their 
GDP per capita exceed the minimum of US$ 1 500 in 1998. However, they were designated as LDC 
countries under amendments to the AGOA act in 2002 (AGOA II) and 2004 (AGOA IV). Mauritius 
was temporarily granted the third-country fabric derogation from October 2004-September 2005 under 
the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill of 2004 (known as AGOA III). More recently Mauritius qualified for the 
third-country fabric derogation in November 2008 for a period of 4 years.  
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production activities were taking place.
8 Although the special LDBC rule was 
originally scheduled to expire after three years, it was extended in 2004 for another 
three years and in 2007 for a further five. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Countries not defined as “lesser-developed” such as South Africa and 
Mauritius did receive AGOA preferences, but they were required to meet GSP rules 
of origin that for clothing required the use of US or regional yarns or fabric. Because 
the different treatment for higher income countries provides a useful control group, 
AGOA provides an ideal opportunity to explore the role of different types of rules of 
origin in preferential arrangements. And the experience demonstrates how important 
they can be: US imports of clothing from AGOA countries (SITC 84- Apparel and 
Clothing Accessories) increased from $730 million in 2000 to $1755 million in 2004. 
This growth was dominated by US imports of clothing from the least developed 
African countries which increased by four hundred percent, almost all of which took 
advantage of the lesser developed country provision (See Figure 1). The largest 
growth in exports between 2000 and 2004 came from Lesotho (up from $140 million 
to $456 million) and over the same period very significant increases also occurred in 
Kenya (up from $43 million to $270 million), Madagascar ($110 million to $323 
million), Swaziland ($32 million to $179 million) and Namibia (0 to $79 million) 
(Figure 2). By contrast in 2004, US imports of clothing from South Africa and 
                                                 
8 AGOA privileges also require protecting US intellectual property rights, observing labor rights, 
proving access to US trade and investment and implementing rule of law. Apparel exports require 
adopting an effective visa system to prevent transshipment   
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Mauritius, the two largest African clothing exporters when AGOA was passed, were 
actually 18 million dollars lower than they had been in 2000 (Figure 2).  
 
[FIGURE 1 & 2 HERE] 
 
AGOA also stimulated entry into new clothing markets. Table 2 reports the 
number of HTS ten-digit apparel products produced by AGOA countries. Overall 
AGOA countries export limited ranges of apparel products. South Africa, Mauritius 
and Madagascar had the widest range of products (over 130 each) prior to the 
implementation of AGOA in 2000. AGOA preferences increased product penetration. 
Many countries experienced exceptional increases in the total number of lines from 
2000 to 2004 (see Kenya from 45 to 155, Swaziland from 47 to 139, Lesotho from 60 
to 118). 
9 In most countries however these trends reversed after 2005, but still 
remained above 2000 levels. 
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
AGOA countries have experienced setbacks, however, first when the 
constraints on their (mainly Asian) competitors were lifted with the expiration of the 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement in 2005 and second with the slump in the US because of the 
global financial crisis.
 10  As a result, U.S. imports declined, although for the least 
developed AGOA countries still remained three times as large as in 2000. By contrast, 
                                                 
9 The largest contractions in Lesotho occurred in firms producing knitted garments; those producing 
woven garments (e.g. denim) did better. See Bennet op. cit. 
10 In July 2007 Lesotho Clothing and Applied Workers Union estimated employment at 44,000 
compared to 55,000 in 2004.     
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despite AGOA, imports from South Africa and Mauritius combined were decimated 
and in 2008 were only a third of their 2000 levels.  
Several research papers have confirmed what is obvious to the naked eye -- 
that the lesser developed country provisions have played a key role in the outcomes. 
Using a variety of methodologies, empirical estimates confirm that preferences under 
AGOA are a significant determinant of Apparel exports: Mattoo, Devesh, and 
Subramanian (2003) stressed the role of rules of origin in limiting the overall benefits 
from AGOA to all recipients. Collier & Venables (2007) find that the AGOA apparel 
provision had a positive and significant effect. Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) 
find that the AGOA had a “large and robust effect that grew over time” and estimate 
that overall AGOA apparel exports increased by 53 percent with stronger impacts on 
products with high initial levels of protection. Portugal-Perez (2008) report an impact 
of 96 percent for 22 countries eligible for the third-country fabric provision, and 303 
percent for the top 7 beneficiaries 
11 In addition to higher export volumes there is also 
evidence that AGOA exporters enjoyed higher prices and captured some of the tariff 
rents created by the preferences (Olarreaga and Özden, 2005). Apparently, whatever 
Africa’s handicaps, they have not prevented substantial responses: indeed, there is no 
evidence of differential effects in taking advantage of AGOA based on measures of 
corruption or institutional quality (Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010). 
Despite the impressive growth in volumes, there is also some disquieting 
evidence in AGOA’s performance that relates to the issue of dynamic benefits. 
Decompositions of output growth reported in Table 3 reveal that the export of new 
product lines (the extensive margin) contributed only 30 percent of total AGOA 
import growth from LDC special rule countries between 2000 and 2004, and 42 
                                                 
11 Other studies include Brenton and Ikezuki (2005), Gibbon (2003), Seyoum (2007), Nouve (2005), 
Rolfe and Woodward (2005), FIAS (2006).  
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percent of the decline from 2004-08. Strikingly only 8 percent of the growth in 
Lesotho’s apparel exports took the form of new products. The share of product lines 
accounted for by the top four and top ten HS 10-digit products is around sixty and 
eighty percent and has remained fairly constant throughout the period. In addition, 
production is predominantly CMT (Cut-Make-Trim) with little value addition and 
there is little evidence of dynamic spillovers to other sectors of the economies (Lall 
2005). These trends are exemplified by the development of Lesotho’s clothing 
industry in response to the AGOA preferences. Therefore, before presenting and 
testing a theory that can explain these outcomes, we describe briefly the history of 
Lesotho’s clothing industry. 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
Lesotho 
As the largest apparel exporter to the US, Lesotho is of particular interest.  
Whereas some countries such as Namibia, Malawi and Botswana, became clothing 
exporters for the first time after AGOA, the response of Lesotho actually built on a 
longer historical experience in which trade preferences and policies also played an 
important part. The industry was launched in the 1980s when Taiwanese 
manufacturers, originally based in South Africa, moved to Lesotho in order to avoid 
trade sanctions imposed by the US and Europe on what was then the Apartheid 
regime.  More investors were attracted in the late 1980s, after the European Union 
signed the Lomé convention, which granted special preferences to the ACP countries 
that had formerly been colonies. While the clothing preferences in Lomé had a double 
transformation rule, Lesotho was granted a temporary derogation from the  
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requirement allowing it to use third country fabrics that the investors took advantage 
of.  
When the derogation expired in the mid 90s, exports to Europe plunged and 
they have never recovered (Figure 3). This experience provided the first 
demonstration of the importance of the role of these special preferences in the 
viability of Lesotho’s exports of clothing. Clothing exports to the United States were 
subject to tariffs but were also constrained by quota restrictions under the MFA. As 
these became increasingly binding on others,  Lesotho’s foreign owned firms shifted 
to exporting to the United States to take advantage of its unfilled quotas. Lesotho’s 
concentration of exports in products where quota constraints on Chinese exports were 
binding is clearly revealed in Figure 4. Thus even prior to the passage of AGOA, 
firms based in Lesotho, most of which were subsidiaries of Asian multinationals were 
exporting to the US. Indeed, after 1999, 99 percent of all Lesotho’s apparel exports 
went to the US with only 0.8% going to South Africa and just 0.2% to the EU.  
 
[FIGURE 3] 
 
The small share of Lesotho’s exports going to South Africa also indicates the 
important role played by fabric rules of origin. The US MFN tariff on clothing is 
around 17 percent, while the SACU tariff is about 40 percent. Thus garments exported 
to South Africa from Lesotho (which is within the customs union) have a much larger 
margin of preference. Yet Lesotho is far more competitive in the US than in SACU.
12 
                                                 
12 Indeed according to Sandrey et al. (2005) Lesotho cannot even compete in Lesotho! “Examination of 
the local clothing retail outlets reveals a predominance of both Chinese and South African garments.”  
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The reason is that to sell in South Africa, Lesotho has to pay SACU tariffs or SACU 
prices for fabric. By contrast, under AGOA it obtains these duty free.
13   
 
[FIGURE 4] 
 
AGOA has been in effect for a decade but there is little evidence that much of 
Lesotho’s industry could survive without preferences or that it has diversified 
horizontally into new products and markets or vertically into greater domestic value 
addition. Factories in Lesotho continue to concentrate on just a narrow range of 
garments: the most basic low unit value categories knitted tee-shorts, slacks, blouses 
and blue-jeans. The slice of the production chain they participate in is narrow and 
does not seem to be expanding. Most apparel manufacturing in Lesotho is CMT (Cut-
Make-Trim). The firms, almost entirely foreign owned, typically provide assembly, 
packaging and shipping services and depend on their Asian headquarters to generate 
orders, design the clothes and send them the fabric they need.  This can be seen by 
comparing the industry wage bill for 50,000 workers (approximately $1000 per 
worker) i.e. $50 million in 2004 with total US exports valued at $456 million. Most of 
the value is thus added to other parts of the chain. Almost none of the managers are 
locals and the buyers of fabric and the marketers of the garments and the key strategic 
corporate decisions are all made thousands of miles away in Asia. 
                                                 
13 To be sure, factors besides favourable rules of origin have contributed to Lesotho’s performance. 
(Maloney, 2006) These include fluctuations in the Rand to which its currency is tied (favourable 
between 2000 and 2002) and other policies to assist exporters by the Lesotho Government. In addition 
Lesotho has benefited from a favourable international image as a non-sweatshop producer (Seidman 
2009).  It has also been promoted by Bono in his campaign against Aids. The Lesotho National 
Development Corporation (LNDC) has played an active role, offering favourable rents for factory 
shells. The government also provided generous tax treatment from the Government --reduced from 15 
to 0 in 2006 – and sought to maintain industrial peace with a Directorate of Dispute Prevention and 
Resolution. The Government has used the Duty-Credit-Certificate Scheme of the South African 
Customs Union that gives apparel firms between 10 and 25 percent of the FOB value of their exports in 
certificates which allow them to import textiles or apparel duty-free.   
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The local production process is characterized by highly routine steps used to 
produce very large volumes. Just one buyer -- the US retailer the GAP -- accounts for 
almost 40 percent of overall output.  The combination of the large scale on which they 
operate and the large orders by concentrated buyers, makes it difficult for small firms 
to enter the market. In addition, to move up the value chain and to produce 
differentiated products in smaller batches requires more skilled workers. This is part 
of the explanation for Lesotho’s inability to do well in the relatively small South 
African market in which demand is more varied. 
One firm in Lesotho has built a denim plant.
14 But with this exception, all 
fabrics are imported. Lesotho and other AGOA countries, even South Africa, 
therefore, lack the domestic textile industry that would allow them to meet the regular 
clothing rules of origin in US preference programs.  
Lesotho’s workers have relatively low productivity levels and their skills do 
not appear to have increased over time.
15 Lall ascribes the lack of improvement in part 
to the Labor Code Rule that prohibits the use of piece rate. He noted “Despite a 
decade and a half or experience in CMT operations, productivity in Lesotho is below 
that of major competitors. Since wages are comparable, its competitiveness cannot 
outlast trade privileges” (Lall 2005). 
The relatively low quality of Lesotho’s (and other AGOA) apparel exports is 
also revealed in the comparative price of its exports. Table 4 presents the average unit 
values of the top 15 apparel products at HS 10-digit level exported by Lesotho to the 
US in 2004. These unit values are compared against the average unit value of other 
                                                 
14 In 2004 the industry faced a major challenge which the potential expiration of the special rule.  Partly 
anticipating the expiration of the Special Rule in 2004, the Nien Hsing Group of Taiwan invested over 
$100 million to build the Formosa Mill, a state of the art denim fabric mill. 
15 Lall (2005) estimated that while Lesotho’s wages were similar to Asian levels, its productivity was 
typically only fifty percent of East Asian levels. According to Morris and Sedowski (2006), worker 
productivity has not increased over a ten year period. See also Morris (2006).  
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lesser-developed AGOA countries and the 10
th, 25
th, median, 75
th and 90
th percentile 
unit values of the 226 countries in the sample. In all but one case when it is just below 
the 25
th percentile, the unit values of Lesotho’s apparel exports fall between the 25
th 
and 50
th percentile range.  
 
[TABLE 4] 
 
What is also striking is the range of unit values even within these highly 
disaggregated product lines (see Schott 2004). For example, the 90
th percentile unit 
value of a dozen women’s or girls’ cotton pullovers (Lesotho’s top apparel export) in 
2004 was 280 dollars versus 31 dollars for Lesotho exports.  
The combination of a productivity disadvantage and almost no domestic 
textile industry makes the industry’s survival totally dependent on its preferences. 
Each time the expiration of the special rule has drawn near, therefore studies have 
issued credible and dire warnings about the industry’s ability to survive without them 
(Salm, 2002 and Bennett, 2006). 
This experience makes it clear that trade need not automatically lead to growth 
and the manner in which trade is stimulated could well prove consequential for the 
amount and nature of the growth it stimulates.  In particular it suggests that trade that 
is stimulated by preferences might well have different effects than trade that occurs 
for other reasons. 
Why this disappointment? Both Lall (2005) and Collier and Venables (2007) 
suggest it may be that these AGOA countries are simply too underdeveloped for the 
exports to ignite the process. Collier and Venables argue it reflects a lack of 
complementary inputs that are required to exploit scale economies. They suggest that  
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preferences are only likely to work if countries already have “the skills and 
infrastructure to be near the threshold of global manufacturing competitiveness” 
(P1328). Lall also suggests that part of the explanation could lie with having foreign 
factory owners – most of whom are Taiwanese, --  that are not closely integrated into 
the local community.  Ironically, this might suggest that these kinds of preferences 
should be given to the more advanced developing countries like South Africa rather 
than the least developed countries that have received them.  
In this paper, however, we will explore a different explanation that has been 
overlooked in the literature. We will argue that both the positive and negative 
responses to AGOA are no accident. Indeed, they are the consequences that economic 
theory would lead us to expect, given the form in which the preferences have been 
granted. 
As we will show using the theory of effective protection, preferences 
combined with the third country fabric rule can have powerful financial effects. They 
could easily be the equivalent of a subsidy to production that is two or three times 
higher than the 17 percent preference margin granted by AGOA through MFN tariff 
relief on clothing. This allows AGOA producers to offset cost disadvantages due to 
the lower productivity of their workers and greater distance from suppliers and 
markets and helps explain why the initial responses to AGOA (and the availability of 
unused MFA quotas) were so powerful.   
On the other hand, in theory the preferences also have two deleterious effects. 
First, they steer firms mainly toward the simplest products in which clothing 
producers add little value. Thus the preferences tax skills acquisition and discourage 
firms from moving up the value-chain. Second, the preferences (and the MFA) 
discourage backward linkages because they induce exporters to use relatively  
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expensive fabrics rather than the cheaper fabrics that are more likely to be produced in 
poor countries. 
 In sum, trade preferences “work.” They can stimulate trade, raise incomes in 
developing countries and boost employment. But whether they actually lead to 
development conceived of as a cumulative growth process is much less certain.  
In addition changes in other trade policies at first helped and then hindered 
AGOA’s performance. On the one hand, the MFA initially provided an especially 
favorable environment for AGOA countries to produce low unit value products 
because it not only constrained their Asian competitors but also induced these 
exporters to shift towards higher quality products.  On the other hand, when the MFA 
was removed, constrained countries such as China moved strongly into precisely the 
markets in which AGOA countries had specialized. Although AGOA helped the least 
developed African countries withstand this shock, they were nonetheless adversely 
affected.   
This paper proceeds now in three sections. In the first we discuss the economic 
theory of the effects these regimes are likely to have. In the second, we conduct 
several empirical tests of the theory and in the final section we present our 
conclusions.   
Theory 
The overview of Lesotho’s export performance identified the influence of two trade 
policies: (i) the effect of MFA quotas and their removal and (ii) the effect of AGOA 
tariff preferences and rules of origin. In this section we draw on economic theory to 
investigate the impact of these policies. The focus is on incentives they create for the 
production and export of particular types of clothing products. We are particularly  
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interested in the impact on product characteristics such as quality, fabric-use and 
value addition in recipient countries.  
We will show that the regime governing clothing trade can be expected to 
have a profound impact on clothing production choices in countries like Lesotho. In 
particular, we will demonstrate that the MFA not only provided a subsidy to 
Lesotho’s clothing exports but also created incentives for it to specialize in low 
quality and low valued-added products. The AGOA program provided an even more 
powerful incentive to expand exports of low value added clothing products, but it had 
an additional effect. The third-country fabric provision encouraged further 
specialization in clothing products with high fabric cost shares.  
Some of the arguments we will use are not new. The body of literature on how 
trade policies influence product characteristics is well established in the case of quotas 
(Falvey, 1979; Krishna, 1987, Feenstra, 1988) and transport costs (Alchian and Allen, 
1964; Hummels and Skiba, 2004). The central result in this literature is that quotas 
and unit transport costs lead to quality upgrading, while tariffs do not.  However, the 
literature generally assumes integrated production, and less studied are the effects of 
quotas and tariffs on the quality and value-addition when products contain imported 
intermediate inputs. This analysis therefore explores how tariff preferences and their 
associated rules of origin lead to changes in the quality of goods produced and 
exported. We focus on clothing and fabric inputs although some of the results would 
be applicable to other products that are manufacturing with imported intermediate 
inputs. 
Most apparel firms located in Lesotho sell products to the U.S. through ‘full 
package’ intermediaries located in East Asia. These ‘full package’ suppliers compete 
with others for orders in the US and Europe (Lall, 2005). They then contract these out  
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to their associated apparel producers, either through competitive bidding or through 
some allocation rule. Lesotho, for example, will export all products for which its 
production costs are lower than its competitor suppliers. 
We are therefore going to develop a simple model which captures this intra-
firm allocation and thus the relative shares of two countries, think Lesotho and China, 
in the US apparel imports. We model clothing as an array of products containing 
varying quantities of labor and fabric inputs. We determine patterns of value-addition 
and specialization in a Ricardian framework that captures the effects of differences in 
fabric intensity. We then explore the effects of changes in market access policies on 
production choices in both countries. In particular we highlight how these policy 
changes affect both the volumes (intensive margin) and the types of products (the 
extensive margin) each of the countries will export.  
Model 
We assume apparel products are differentiated by type of product and the content of 
fabric.
16 Each apparel product z is associated with a point on an interval [0,1] and is 
assembled using labor and fabric according to a constant returns to scale Leontief 
production function:
17 
 ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( min ) ( z z F z a z L z y    
                                                 
16 Mattoo et al. (2003) develop an alternative model with decreasing returns and infinite demand to 
show how both tariff preferences and waivers of rules of origin increase exports of existing products. 
They do not deal with the impact on product quality, nor export of new varieties.  
17 Portugal-Perez (2008) assumes a similar production function. A clear limitation of this model is that 
it does not take into account capital (sewing machines, fabric cutters, irons, washing and drying 
machines) used in the production of apparel. However, in a world where this type of capital is 
internationally mobile, it is the non-traded factors that become the primary determinant of a country’s 
comparative advantage (Wood and Mayer, 2001).   
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a(z) is the labor used per unit output, L(z) is the quantity of labor, F(z) is the quantity 
of fabric and (z) is the unit fabric requirement in square meters (the input-output 
coefficient).  
Using the cost function dual to the production function, the unit cost c(z) of 
clothing (assuming no transport costs) is given as: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( z PF z w z a z c     (1) 
where w is the wage and PF(z) is the price per square meter fabric associated with 
product z. We also assume firms are competitive, so equilibrium profits are zero and 
the free on board price equals costs, i.e.  
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( z PF z w z a z c z p     . (2) 
Products are therefore differentiated according to their unit labor requirements, 
as well as unit fabric costs which are affected by the quantity and price of fabric used. 
For example, we would expect more complex apparel products (e.g. suits) to require 
more labor than simple products (e.g. T-shirts). Although we do not model quality 
specifically, we would also expect higher quality apparel to require more labor 
services and higher priced fabric than lower quality products.  
The allocation decision 
The allocation process depends on the relative cost of production across different 
locations. Lesotho will export all products for which its costs are less than or equal to 
those from China. This allocation condition can be specified as: 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( z PF z w z a z PF z w z a
         (3) 
where transport costs are assumed to be zero and * denotes foreign competitor 
(China). Under free trade where fabric is internationally traded and there are no  
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differences in unit fabric costs (PF(z) = PF*(z)), we can re-specify the relationship in 
terms of Lesotho’s Relative Unit Labor Cost (RULC): 
1
) (
) (
) (     z a w
z wa
z RULC    (4) 
Here, home (Lesotho) exports all apparel products for which its unit labor costs are 
lower than its foreign competitors. Alternatively, China exports all apparel products 
for which its relative wages are less than or equal to its relative productivity. 
This result implies that comparative advantage when intermediate inputs can 
be obtained at world prices is entirely dependent on the relative effective price of the 
non-traded factor. This outcome is equivalent to that of the Dornbusch, Fischer and 
Samuelson (DFS) (1977) Ricardian model with a continuum of goods. The fabric 
content of apparel therefore has no influence on what is produced by the home 
country. We will see later that this no longer holds once we introduce quotas and 
preferential trade barriers.  
Consumption and Equilibrium 
To close the model, we assume that there is no US apparel production, that countries 
only export apparel to the U.S. and that U.S. consumers have identical and homothetic 
preferences. Utility is Cobb-Douglas for a numeraire good (non-clothing products), 
but is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function in the quantities of the 
differentiated clothing products. The utility function is specified as:
18 
1 0 ) (
1
0
1
0   

 

 
  

 
 C dz z C u  (5) 
where  C(z) denotes total U.S. consumption of apparel products z and C0 is 
consumption of all other goods. U.S consumers spend a constant fraction  of their 
                                                 
18 See Dixit and Norman (1980: 282).  
 
21
21
income on apparel products with the remainder spent on the numeraire good. In 
addition, the differentiated apparel products are substitutes with a constant elasticity 
of substitution given by  1 ) 1 /( 1      .
19  
Since u is a separable utility function, the optimal choice of apparel products 
can be obtained by maximizing the CES component of the utility function subject to 
expenditure being less than or equal to I where I is U.S. income. Optimal demand by 
U.S. consumers for each product z is given by 
P
I
P
z p
z C

 





 
) (
) (  (6) 
where the price index of the CES quantity index is given by 
) 1 ( 1 1
0
1 ) (



 

 

   dz z p P . 
A rise in the relative price of a particular product will therefore result in a 
disproportionate reduction (as  > 1) in the relative consumption of that product.
20 
Assuming a sufficiently large number of products, the elasticity of demand for each 
product will be given by . 
The model so far differs importantly from the Dixit/Stiglitz (1977) and 
Krugman (1979, 1980) monopolistic competition models in that we assume perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale. The full range of apparel products will 
therefore be produced and prices will equal marginal cost in equilibrium.
21 In 
                                                 
19 Note that this is ensures that the differentiated goods are closer substitutes among themselves than 
are the differentiated goods and the numeraire good. We do not modify the CES function to allow for 
quality as in Hummels and Klenow (2005). A quality index acts as a demand shifter, leading to higher 
consumption at every given price. 
20 To see this take the ratio of (6) for product 1 to product 2 to obtain:  
   ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 z p z p z C z C . 
21 While we could follow DFS (1977) and use a Cobb-Douglas utility function for U.S. consumers, this 
has the disadvantageous outcome that the value of U.S. imports of each variety does not change. 
Growth in foreign exports to the US can only be achieved through growth along the extensive margin. 
This outcome is inconsistent with the empirical evidence.  
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addition, the value of exports of any product decline in response to a rise in relative 
prices, with a greater change the more substitutable are the differentiated products: 
I
P
z p
z C z p 
 





 
1
) (
) ( ) (  
The final condition for equilibrium is that labor demand equals labor supply 
(L), or alternatively that labor income equals the wage bill in the clothing sector. 
Assume that apparel products are indexed according to diminishing Chinese relative 
unit labor requirements, (a*(z)/a(z)). With z  denoting a hypothetical dividing line 
between Chinese exports (0,z ) and Lesotho exports (z ,1), the home and foreign 
labor market clearing condition are respectively represented as: 
 
z
dz z C z wa wL
0 ) ( ) (  (7) 
and  

    
1
) ( ) (
z dz z C z a w L w . (8) 
Taking the ratio of these two conditions gives: 
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This schedule is upward sloping on z.
 A rise in the range of products exported by 
Lesotho at constant relative wages increases the demand for labor in Lesotho and 
reduces the demand for labor in the competitor country. This raises the relative wage 
in Lesotho required to equate demand and supply of labor. Equilibrium is achieved 
through reductions in relative U.S. consumption of Lesotho exports in response to 
higher prices.  
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If relative wages are fixed, as may be expected in Lesotho where 
unemployment is very high, then the adjustment to equilibrium will be through 
changes in the relative employment of labor in the apparel sector (L*/L falls). In what 
follows, we impose the fixed wage assumption to avoid unnecessary complexity 
associated with the marginal effect of relative wage changes on the range of products 
exported. Together, equations (2), (3), (6), (7) (8) and the price index solve for 
Chinese and Lesotho wages, the geographic specialization of apparel exports, the 
price index P and U.S. consumption and prices across the full spectrum of products. 
Quotas and product choice for exporting firms 
The MFA was important in the markets in which Lesotho and other clothing 
producers operated and its application and elimination had major effects (Harrigan 
and Barrows, 2009). Quotas on clothing imports into developed economies were 
widely applied under the MFA with imports from China particularly constrained 
(Brambilla, Khandelwa and Schott, 2010). The MFA, therefore, led to a geographical 
dispersion of clothing production as producers re-located to countries where there 
were unused quotas. Lesotho (and other AGOA countries) was a beneficiary of this 
relocation of production as its US quotas were not filled.
22 But the effects on clothing 
products were not all the same. As we will argue, quotas under the MFA induced the 
export of low value added, fabric-intensive and low priced (low quality) clothing 
products in developing countries such as Lesotho. 
It is well established in the literature that under competitive conditions a quota 
is equivalent to a specific tariff (Falvey, 1979). The result also holds in cases of 
                                                 
22 For data on quota fill rates see the US Office for Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA) 
(http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/). Brambilla et al. (2010) provide a review of the fill rates for various countries 
since the 1980s.  
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imperfect competition (Feenstra 1988, 2004).
23 While the quota restricts the total 
volume of sales, its effect differs across products produced by the firm. Firms adjust 
exports of different products to ensure that they earn the same quota premium from 
each good exported (Feenstra, 2004). The effect is that exports of low priced (low 
quality) products are the most adversely affected. 
We find similar effects in our model. Assume apparel quotas are imposed on 
imports from China. The specific tariff effect of the quota (denoted as s) alters the 
allocation condition (equation 3) that determines the range of apparel products 
exported by Lesotho. The condition becomes: 
s z PF z w z a z PF z w z a    
   ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (   . (10) 
Assuming, for exposition purposes, that both Lesotho and China have access to fabric 
at world prices ( ) ( ) ( z PF z PF 
 ), this equation can be re-specified in terms of 
Lesotho’s Relative Unit Labor Cost (RULC):
24 
     
w z a
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z wa
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Further, if we let 
*(z) denote the share of fabric in foreign costs 
() ( / ) ( ) ( ) ( z c z PF z z
     ) and therefore 1-
*(z) as unit labor costs as a share of 
total costs ( ) ( ) ( z c z a w
    ), we can simplify the allocation condition even more to: 
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    
 

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23 See Krishna (1987) for an imperfect competition model where firms jointly select the quantity and 
the quality of the products they export in response to a quota. Feenstra (1988, 2004) also show how 
quotas lead to an upgrading of the characteristics within each variety produced. 
24 In Lesotho, for example, import duties were rebated on imported fabric used in the production of 
apparel exports. We ignore the effects that transport cost differentials have on the relationship. Specific 
transport costs on output can be modelled in an equivalent way to the effect of specific tariffs and 
quotas. For example, relatively high specific transport costs on output for the competitor country have 
the equivalent effect on quality as our example for quotas. See Falvey (1979) and Hummels and Skiba 
(2004).  
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The effect of the quota is a modified allocation condition in which the right hand side 
of the DFS equation (4) is raised by the term 
   c s ) 1 (  . This term is positive and 
rises if, ceterus paribus, s increases, costs fall or the share of fabric in production 
rises. 
We can consider four implications of quotas under the MFA for apparel 
exports from Lesotho using this relationship.
25 Firstly, the effect of a quota is 
equivalent to a specific subsidy on exports from non-quota constrained countries such 
as Lesotho. This enables Lesotho’s producers to export apparel products even if they 
do not have a comparative advantage in the production of that product, i.e. where their 
RULC exceeds 1 by up to  ) ( )) ( 1 ( z c z s
   . The implicit subsidy conferred by the 
tariff compensates the relatively inefficient apparel producers for their high relative 
unit labor costs and helps explain why countries such as Lesotho exported apparel 
under the MFA despite productivity levels that were lower and wage levels that were 
comparable to those of Asian levels (Lall 2005).  
The second consideration is that the implicit subsidy of the quota for Lesotho 
(and other non-quota constrained countries) is a greater percent of the overall value 
the lower is the price ( ) (z c
 ) of the product exported by China. This is the standard 
result for quotas obtained by Falvey (1979). Quota constrained countries upgrade 
quality of exports by shifting to higher priced varieties. What we show here is that the 
                                                 
25 There are two additional considerations. Missing from this story is the fact that within-quota tariffs 
were also imposed under the MFA. As shown by Hummels and Skiba (2004), ad valorem tariffs lower 
the relative demand for high-quality goods in the presence of per unit transport costs (or equivalently 
quotas). As tariffs rise, the shadow price of the quota constraint falls and dampens the effect (but not 
direction) of the quota on relative demand for high-quality products. The final consideration is that 
import quotas administered by the Office of Textiles and Apparels (OTEXA) are specified in terms of 
yardage of fabric equivalents and not quantity of goods. In this case, the quota is equivalent to a 
specific tariff on the price per square meter of fabric equivalence, i.e. the allocation condition is: 
s z c z c  
   / ) ( / ) ( . The implication for Lesotho is that relative demand and relative prices shift 
in favor of exporting low priced clothing varieties that are intensive in the use of cheap fabric.  
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gap in the market is filled by non-quota constrained countries that may not have been 
able to compete prior to the quotas, i.e. where their RULC exceeded 1. 
The third consideration is novel to our model. Holding costs constant, the 
effective subsidy, i.e. the subsidy as a proportion of value added, rises exponentially 
with the share of costs (of the efficient producer) attributed to fabric. Alternatively, 
the effective subsidy is greater the smaller the value added of the product.  
Take for example, two apparel products each priced at US$ 10, but differing in terms 
of fabric-intensity: Fabric costs make up 90 percent of the cost of product A and 1 
percent of the cost of product B. Assume further that the specific tariff equivalent of a 
quota on imports from China is 1 dollar. The resulting effective export subsidy for 
Lesotho is just over 1 percent for product B, but is 100 percent for product A. In fact, 
the effective subsidy is 100 percent for any product in which China’s labor costs are 
equal to 1 dollar. The implication is that firms in Lesotho will be able to compete in 
exporting product B, even if their unit labor costs are 100 percent higher than those of 
the competitive quota constrained supplier (China). These considerations explain how 
the quotas enable an expansion in the range of products exported by Lesotho and 
other non-quota constrained countries, i.e. growth along the extensive margin. 
The impact of the quota is to shift the Chinese out of low prices products. This 
implies that relative price increase of Chinese exports will be strongest in low priced 
products. This leads to the fourth effect: Lesotho will also experience growth in the 
volume and value of existing exports (intensive margin) as the relative price of their 
existing exports falls relative to the exports from quota constrained countries (their 
export price falls relative to the average price index, see equation 6).. Therefore in 
Lesotho we expect the strongest intensive margin growth in exports in existing low  
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priced products. In contrast, quota constrained countries experience a decline in the 
range, value and volume of their exports, particularly in low priced products. 
In conclusion, we expect four effects of the MFA on Lesotho and other AGOA 
countries (and other non-quota constrained countries): a rise in the export of both (i) 
existing and (ii) new apparel products combined with specialization in (iii) cheap low 
quality products with (iv) very little value addition. The removal the MFA would have 
had the opposite effects. Previously quota constrained countries would shift 
production towards cheaper products with lower labor value added. Unconstrained 
countries would thus be especially adversely affected in these shifts, both in terms of 
the range and value of their apparel exports. 
Tariff preferences and product choice 
We now turn to an analysis of the effect of the tariff preferences granted under 
AGOA. Generally, theory suggests that in a competitive market ad valorem tariffs 
have no impact on value-addition as they preserve relative prices faced by the firm 
and the consumer (Falvey, 1979; Feenstra 1988).
26 This changes once we introduce 
tariffs and tariff preferences in a model where products contain internationally traded 
intermediate inputs such as fabric.  
Once tariffs are introduced, what determines whether Lesotho exports product 
y(z) is whether the tariff inclusive price of its good in the US market is less than or 
equal to its foreign competitor, China:
 27 
  
     t z c t z c 1 ) ( 1 ) (  (13) 
                                                 
26 Krishna (1987) presents an imperfect competition model where the firm’s choice of output and 
quality is influenced by ad valorem tariff rates. 
27 To simplify the model we have assumed that the ad valorem tariff does not vary by variety. Apparel 
tariffs actually vary enormously according to the type of fabric used and in some cases according to the 
quantity and amount of fabric used in production. Extending the model to allow for variation in tariffs 
across z does not alter the main insights of the theory.  
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Letting  (z) denote the Lesotho fabric price relative to the Chinese fabric price, 
) ( ) ( z PF z PF
 , we can express the allocation condition (13) in terms of relative unit 
labor costs (RULC) and fabric cost shares () as follows: 
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The cut off point defining what products will be exported by Lesotho is now a 
function of relative tariff rates faced, fabric-intensity and relative fabric prices. To 
explore the implications for product choice under AGOA, three different scenarios are 
compared:   
(a) Case 1: Pre-AGOA with MFN tariffs and competitive input supplies,  
(c) Case 2: AGOA tariff preferences for LDC Special Rule beneficiaries,  
(d) Case 3: AGOA tariff preferences for non-LDC Special Rule beneficiaries 
Case 1: No preferences, MFN tariff rates (t = t*) and access to competitively priced 
inputs 
In the first scenario the US imposes common MFN tariffs on apparel imports from 
Lesotho and China. For MFN trade there are no rules of origin requirements or 
restrictions on access to internationally priced fabric, so barring domestic restrictions 
on use of inputs, all countries have access to internationally priced fabric, i.e. 
((z)=1).  
In this scenario, the product allocation condition 14 reduces to the standard 
RULC condition of the DFS model (equation 4). Tariffs affect both countries 
equivalently and the unit fabric cost components cancel each other out. The 
geographic location of production is determined entirely by relative unit labor costs, 
with specialization according to comparative advantage. Fabric intensity has no  
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bearing on what a country exports. Tariff protection in this scenario introduces no 
fabric-use bias.  
Case 2: Preferential access granted to home (t=0, t*>0) and no rules of origin 
The second scenario is set up to reflect the AGOA preferences granted to Lesotho and 
other LDBCs. These countries are granted a tariff preference into the U.S. (t = 0, 
t*>0), but under the LDC Special Rule are also able to use internationally competitive 
third-country fabric in the production of apparel exports. Given our assumption of no-
transport costs, fabric prices are therefore equal in Lesotho and China (((z)=1). 
The allocation condition in this case simplifies to: 
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What can be observed from the relationship is that the effective preference is a 
function of both the tariff preference as well as the ratio of fabric cost shares to value 
added costs shares (*/(1-*)). We explore the implications of this in more detail. 
Take a scenario where apparel products contain no fabric, i.e. * = 0, and the 
term on the far right of equation 15 falls away. The tariff preference has a uniform 
impact on all apparel products and allows Lesotho to export products in which it is up 
to 1+t* times less efficient at producing than China. For example, a tariff preference 
of 20 percent enables the home country to export new apparel products where its unit 
labor costs are up to 20 percent greater than their foreign competitors.  
In addition to the export of new products (i.e. growth along extensive margin), 
the tariff reductions under AGOA also raise U.S. consumption of existing products 
exported by Lesotho (i.e. the intensive margin) through reductions in the relative U.S. 
consumer price of these goods. The effect on the volume and value of exports could  
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be very large if products are highly substitutable. We would therefore expect to see 
growth in exports along both the intensive and extensive margin. 
Once fabric is introduced, the AGOA preferences alter relative incentives to 
export products of different unit fabric contents. In particular, the tariff preference is 
greater for products with higher fabric cost shares. This is revealed by the second term 
on the right hand side which is positive and increasing (exponentially) in *. As the 
fabric cost share approaches 1, the effective preference granted to Lesotho converges 
on positive infinity. 
Diagrammatically, this relationship is represented in Figure 5. Assume for 
simplicity sake, that Lesotho’s relative unit labor costs are fixed at   1
 w a aw  on the 
vertical axes for all apparel products. We have also assumed that Lesotho’s RULC 
exceeds 1. On the horizontal access, apparel products are ordered according to rising 
fabric cost shares (or diminishing labor cost shares). In a competitive environment 
where Lesotho and China face the same U.S. tariffs (see Case 1 in Figure 5), Lesotho 
would not export any products as its RULC exceeds 1. With tariff preferences plus 
waivers from the rules of origin granted to Lesotho, the relevant comparison is 
between RULC and the solid line (equals the right hand side of equation 15) identified 
as Case 2 in the Figure. Lesotho is still unable to export products with low fabric cost 
shares. However, because the effective tariff preference rises with fabric cost share, 
Lesotho is able to export all products in which the fabric cost share exceeds 1, 
despite having no comparative advantage in these products. 
In sum, the tariff preference affects Lesotho’s exports in three ways. Firstly, it 
raises the relative unit labor cost threshold by  ) 1 (
 t , which is equivalent to what we 
would expect in a tariff adjusted DFS model. Secondly, the threshold defining the cut-
off-point is higher for fabric intensive products. This arises because tariffs not only  
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tax foreign unit labor costs, but also tax the fabric content of the product. The total 
tariff equivalent preference per unit labor cost is therefore an increasing function of 
the unit fabric cost share.
28 Finally, by reducing the relative price of exports, the 
preferences increase the volume and value of existing imports from beneficiary 
countries. 
The implication for LDC AGOA beneficiaries is that they enter and specialize 
in the export of the most-fabric intensive apparel products. The AGOA preferences to 
LDC beneficiaries therefore compound the existing incentives to produce low value 
added or fabric-intensive products brought about by the MFA. There is one important 
difference. The AGOA incentives are unrelated to the price of the product, only fabric 
intensity whereas the implicit subsidy for non-quota constrained countries under the 
MFA is greatest for low priced fabric-intensive products. 
 
[FIGURE 5] 
 
Case 3: Preferential access granted to home (t=0, t*>0), but rules of origin 
constraints on fabric inputs 
This scenario reflects the situation for non-LDC Special Rule AGOA countries such 
as South Africa (and Mauritius for most of the post 2001 period). Apparel exports 
from these countries have preferential access into the US market, but production is 
subject to a two-stage transformation requirement. Apparel producers from these 
countries are therefore required to use domestic (or U.S.) produced fabric in the 
                                                 
28 In a small-country price taking model, the tariff effects are greatest for fabric intensive products even 
amongst those goods where it has a comparative advantage (the intensive margin). The tariff 
preferences therefore create incentives for firms to expand production most in the low value-added 
fabric-intensive varieties of products they are already exporting. In addition, the preferences would 
encourage entry of the least efficient firms into the most fabric-intensive apparel products.   
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production of exports to the U.S. under AGOA preferences. If these countries produce 
fabric at internationally competitive prices, (z)=1, then the outcome will be 
equivalent to Case 2. However, if local fabric is more expensive than foreign fabric, 
(z)>1, the allocation condition is given by: 
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The relationship differs from equation 15 in that while the home country is granted a 
tariff preference, it has to utilize more expensive domestic fabric. 
The impact on clothing production relative to the pre-AGOA period is 
ambiguous and depends on the fabric price disadvantage relative to the tariff 
preference. Take for instance a scenario (Case 3a) where the home relative fabric 
price disadvantage is less than the tariff preference such that   0 ) ( 1   
 z t  . In this 
scenario, the effective preference rises with fabric-intensity, but less so than in Case 2. 
In Figure 5 this is depicted by the dashed line identified as Case 3a. The home country 
will export all products in which the fabric cost share exceeds 2.  
An alternative scenario (3b) is one where the fabric price disadvantage is 
greater than the tariff preference such that   0 ) ( 1   
 z t  . Here the effective 
preference declines as the fabric-intensity of the product rises. At some level of 
fabric-intensity, the fabric price disadvantage will dominate the tariff preference 
effect and reduce the right hand side of equation (15) to below 1. At this point, there 
is a disadvantage associated with exporting under the preferential access scheme as 
opposed to exporting under MFN rates (Case 1). Firms that are competitive in these 
products, i.e. RULC < 1, will then export under MFN rates. In Figure 5, Case 3b 
depicts the declining effective preference (Case 3b), although in this example, the  
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non-LDC AGOA beneficiaries will not export at all as the allocation condition 15 is 
not met for any product.  
Bar the case of competitive domestic fabric producers, our model predicts that 
LDC AGOA beneficiaries such as Lesotho will experience higher growth in export 
volumes (along both the extensive and intensive margin) to the U.S. than other 
AGOA beneficiaries. The effect will be particularly pronounced in fabric-intensive 
apparel products.  
Other effects 
Other considerations relate to the development of a comparative advantage in the 
nascent industry. Our model raises a number concerns in relation to this. Firstly, the 
incentives steer firms to producing products with the lowest value addition 
conditional on price, rather than up the value-chain. If these products are 
characterized by low positive growth externalities, then the preference may trap firms 
into a lower growth path than alternative preferences that incentive greater value 
addition. 
Secondly, our model does not deal with the opportunity cost of resources used 
in the production of apparel. If labor supply is not infinite, then the growth in the 
apparel industry will raise wages, which may actually drive out export firms in other 
sectors where the home country has a comparative advantage. This also holds for 
other scarce resources such as infrastructure, land and water.  
Thirdly, the specialization by firms in fabric-intensive products makes these 
exporters highly vulnerable to international price volatility (either through exchange 
rates or international prices), preference erosion through lower MFN tariff rates and 
the ending of the waiver of the rules of origin. Changes in these variables result in an 
amplified impact on the effective subsidy provided by the AGOA preferences and the  
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MFA quotas. Preference erosion could therefore provide an additional blow that 
would be seriously underestimated if models fail to capture the contribution of the 
rule of origin preference.   
Finally, the preferences restrict backward linkages by discouraging the 
addition of value added services from other sectors and inducing exporters to use 
expensive fabric that is less likely to be produced in poor countries.  
Empirical application: Testing Methods and Data 
Our background review identified three distinct trade regimes facing AGOA 
recipients from the mid-1990s: (a) Quotas under the MFA, (b) AGOA preferences 
including the third country fabric provision, and (c) the expiration of the MFA. 
Theory suggests that each of these trade regimes had different impacts on the 
incentives facing AGOA and non-AGOA countries  
In what follows we describe the testing approach we use and then apply this to 
highly disaggregated U.S. import data. Our specific focus is on changes in the 
characteristics (value-addition, and fabric intensity) of AGOA apparel exports 
associated with the MFA and AGOA preferences. We ignore the effects on the value 
and range of imports as this is already covered by existing empirical research.
29 The 
empirical method we use is difference-in-difference estimation applied to price 
equations. In essence, we identify changes in the fabric-intensity of U.S. apparel 
                                                 
29 We have estimated triple difference-in-difference equations similar to those of Frazer and van 
Biesebroeck (2010) and do find a surge in apparel imports from lesser-developed beneficiaries relative 
to other AGOA recipients (and the rest of the world) in response to the third-country fabric provision. 
The average growth in imports from 2001 through 2004 associated with the fabric-provision is 
estimated to be up to 282 percent, with stronger effects in products facing high preference margins. We 
also find that that the expiration of the MFA adversely affected exports from AGOA recipients, but the 
effect was mitigated for the least developed AGOA countries by the third-party fabric preferences 
provided under AGOA.  
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imports from AGOA recipients by analyzing changes in the relationship between 
apparel import prices and fabric input prices.  
We find support for our theoretical predictions. Under the MFA, AGOA 
recipients are found to be specialized in fabric-intensive clothing products with low 
value addition relative to quota-constrained (and other) countries. Our estimates 
suggest, however, that the implementation of AGOA led to no further increases in the 
overall fabric intensity of these exports. Lesser-developed beneficiaries 
predominantly expanded the output of the products they were already exporting as a 
result of their MFA preferences, i.e. growth was primarily along the intensive margin.  
However, support for our hypothesis of rising fabric-content in response to the 
AGOA preferences is found after the expiration of the MFA. China and other 
previously quota-constrained countries raised the fabric content of their exports after 
2005 relative to other emerging economies, as predicted by our theory. More 
importantly for this study is that we also find a rise in the fabric-content of lesser-
developed AGOA apparel exports relative to the emerging country control group. 
AGOA preferences therefore helped insulate recipients in those fabric intensive 
products that China and other quota constrained countries increasingly entered into 
after 2005.  
Empirical specification of the price equation 
An important limitation of existing empirical studies on the effect of AGOA on 
import values (Collier & Venables 2007; Portugal-Perez 2008; Frazer and Van 
Biesebroeck 2010) is that import value data, even at the HS 10-digit level, is too 
aggregated to fully capture changes in product characteristics. By only looking at the 
value or range of HS10-digit products exported by each country, existing studies may 
miss important changes occurring within each product line.  
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Take for example, Figure 6 that plots U.S. import unit values on exporter per 
capita GDP (both in logarithmic form) for Women’s and girls’ cotton pullovers 
(Lesotho’s top apparel export) in 2004. The price of imports of this highly 
disaggregated HS10-digit product ranges from under 10 dollars to over 1000 dollars 
per square meter equivalent with higher income economies producing the more 
expensive (higher quality) varieties (as in Hummels and Klenow (2002) and Schott 
(2004)). The lesser-developed AGOA recipients predominantly situate at the low-
price, low-income per capita end of the spectrum.
30  
 
[FIGURE 6]  
 
Our particular focus is on product prices. More specifically, we use difference-
in-difference estimation to exploit the distinct breaks arising from the implementation 
of AGOA and the ending of the MFA and identify whether prices changes and 
changes in the fabric-intensity of apparel products are consistent with those predicted 
by our theory. 
Following Feenstra (2004), the U.S domestic price of an imported good i from 
country c is specified as a function of marginal costs (c*), the exchange rate (e), 
import tariffs (tar), aggregate domestic expenditure (I) and the price of substitute 
goods (q) as follows: 
t t ict
ict ct ict ict
I tar
q e c p
  
   
   
   
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3 2 1
) 1 ln(
ln ln ln ln
. (17) 
                                                 
30 There are exceptions. Apparel unit values of China, India and Indonesia, who were amongst the top 4 
quota restricted countries under the MFA (Brambilla et al. (2010), are higher than predicted. This is 
consistent theoretical predictions of quality upgrading in response to quota restrictions.   
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This is an unrestricted version of a price equation that imposes symmetric pass-
through of the exchange rate and foreign costs (where 1 = 2), symmetric pass-
through of the tariff and exchange rate (where 2 = 4) and homogeneity of degree 1 
in its arguments (1 (=2=4) +3+5 =1).  
We are particularly interested in isolating changes in the fabric content of U.S. 
apparel imports using this equation. This requires a more precise specification of the 
influence of fabric costs on unit costs c*. To simplify the analysis, we impose a unit 
cost function derived from a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas production 
function: 
    
1
ict it t ict pva pf A c  (18) 
pf is the price of the fabric used in the production of good i, pva is the value added 
price (made up labor and capital costs) and At measures total factor productivity. This 
specification imposes the restriction that the proportion of expenditure spent by the 
firm on fabric is constant and is given by . Substituting (18) into (17) gives the 
following equation: 
t t it
it t it it it
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 (19) 
where     1 1   and  ) 1 ( 1 2      . Given the assumptions imposed, the fabric 
content of the clothing product can be calculated as 
               )) 1 ( /( ) /( 1 1 1 2 1 1 . Fabric-intensive products would therefore 
be characterized by large coefficients on the fabric price ( 1  ) relative to the 
coefficient on the value added price ( 2  ).  
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There are two changes in response to the MFA and AGOA that we wish to 
identify: (i) changes in the price level and (ii) changes in the fabric-intensity of U.S. 
apparel imports.  
To identify changes in the level of import prices from a region in response to a 
shock, say AGOA recipients after 2001, the above equation is modified to include an 
interaction between an AGOA dummy variable (DAg) and a dummy variable for the 
post-AGOA period (D01). The basic price equation in this example is then specified 
as: 
ict t ct
ict ict ct
ict it
c ict
prod cntry
tar q e
pva pf
DAg D p
 
  
 

  
   
 
 
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01 ln
4 3 2
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1
. (20) 
where 1 measures the marginal effect of the AGOA preferences (D01) on unit values 
of U.S. imports from AGOA countries (DAgc) relative to all other countries in the 
sample (the control group). Country by product (cntry/prod) fixed effects are 
included, so the regression uses the within-country by product variation of prices and 
the other variables over time to estimate the coefficients.
31 Year fixed effects t are 
also included to account for common shocks across all product varieties.  
To identify changes in the fabric-intensity associated with the various trade 
regimes, we focus on changes in the coefficients on the fabric and value added prices. 
For example, we would expect a shift by AGOA recipients to more fabric intensive 
varieties within each 10-digit product line to be revealed by a rise in the coefficient on 
fabric prices and a decline in the coefficient on value added prices. 
                                                 
31 The standard most restrictive difference specification includes a dummy variable for AGOA 
countries (DAgc), but in equation 22 these have been replaced with country by product fixed effects 
(cntry/prod) to allow for country and product level heterogeneity in the base-level of import prices.  
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We use difference-in-difference estimation to identify changes in the relative 
fabric-content of apparel imports from AGOA beneficiaries. The specification in the 
case of AGOA preferences is as follows: 
ict t ic
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. (21) 
The first row tells us the effect of AGOA on U.S. import unit values of apparel 
products imported from AGOA recipients. Rows 2 and 3, however, are of most 
interest to us. The coefficients on the triple interaction terms (2 and 3) measure the 
marginal impact of AGOA preferences on the fabric-intensity of U.S. imports from 
AGOA recipients (first difference) relative to changes in the fabric-intensity of U.S. 
imports from the control group (second difference). The latter effect is captured by 
the coefficients 4 and 5 in rows 4 and 5. 
  For example, support for our hypothesis that AGOA preferences raise the 
fabric-intensity of imports from recipient countries, would be revealed by a positive 
coefficient on the AGOA country by post-2001 interaction with the fabric price (2) in 
row 2 and a negative coefficient on the AGOA country by post-2001 interaction with 
the value added price (2) in row 3. Note that these coefficients reflect the post 2001 
impact on fabric-intensity in AGOA countries relative to the post-2001 impact on  
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fabric-intensity in the control group which is captured by the coefficients 4 in row 4 
and 5 in row 5.
 32  
Equations 20 and 21 summarize the main approaches used in the following 
analysis. Further refinements to isolate the marginal effects of the MFA and AGOA 
preferences on lesser-developed AGOA beneficiary countries will be explained in the 
relevant empirical sections. 
Data  
The empirical analysis draws on a panel of time-consistent 10-digit HTS 
import data for the U.S. from 1996-2008.
33 The raw data contains approximately 1202 
product lines for Clothing (HS61, 62 and various sub-codes of HS 64 & 65) covering 
224 countries.  
Unlike the price equations specified above, the dependent variable is the log 
import price of clothing exclusive of tariffs, insurance and freight costs. This does not 
affect the estimates, except that the pass-through of tariffs to US domestic prices of 
imports is calculated as 1-7. Looking at the independent variables, we use the foreign 
industry value added deflator (in foreign currency) for pva, the US dollar to foreign 
currency exchange rate for e and US Producer Prices (at 6-digit NAICS level) (usppi) 
and competitor clothing unit values (at 10-digit level) (Pcompete) for substitute 
products q. Applied tariff rates are defined at the 4-digit HS level.
34 In addition to 
                                                 
32 We could also include product by year fixed effects and country by year fixed effects. In this case, 
only variables defined over product, country and time will be retained.  
33 The HTS classification changed frequently throughout the period as new product lines were 
introduced and old product lines were aggregated. We use the Pierce and Schott (2009) concordance 
programme to construct a time-consistent classification for the full period. 
34 We use the average tariff at the HS 4-digit level to avoid erroneous correlations arising from the 
construction of the variables (tariff rate = duty/import value and price = import value/import quantity). 
Using the average may also reduce biases associated with the potential endogeneity of product level 
tariff rates. The trade data are obtained from Peter Schott who constructed the database using US 
Customs Service data. US producer prices are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, fabric 
prices are constructed using UNcomtrade data and the exchange rates are obtained from the World  
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these variables, real GDP per capita measured in PPP prices is included to capture the 
impact on prices of general productivity improvements in the economy and relative 
technological advantage in producing higher-quality goods (Hummels and Klenow 
2005).
 35 
For fabric prices, we calculate Tornqvist price indices for silk (HS50), wool 
and fine animal hair (HS51), cotton (HS 52) and man-made fiber and staple (HS 54 & 
HS55) using unit values derived from world trade data obtained from UNComtrade.
36 
The calculated fabric indices are presented in Figure 7.
37 Of interest, is the relatively 
close association between the average U.S. import unit value of wearing apparel (HS 
61 and HS 62) and fabric prices, particularly man-made fabrics.  
 
[FIGURE 7]  
 
The relevant fabric price (silk, cotton, man-made, wool, or weighted average 
of these) is allocated to each 10-digit HTS clothing product based on the dominant 
fabric used in producing the good.
38 Unfortunately, we are unable to construct 
                                                                                                                                            
Bank World Development Indicator database. Country specific tariff rates at the 4-digit HS level are 
constructed as the sum of duties collected over value of imports. Competitor clothing prices are 
calculated as the geometric average price of all other countries (using import values as weights).  
35 Although the industry value added price is the net effect of productivity and nominal factor prices, 
the real GDP per capita also embodies productivity improvements in the services sector.  
36 The following HS codes for synthetic fibres are also included in man-made products: 550110, 
550120, 550130, 550190, 550200, 550310, 550320, 550330, 550340, 550390, 550410, 550490, 
550610, 550620, 550630, 550690. The average of the fabric prices calculated using world exports and 
world imports are used. 
37 The fabric prices correspond closely with the dominant agricultural commodity used to produce the 
fabric. For example, there is a close fit between cotton-based fabric and raw cotton prices, and wool-
based fabric and wool prices.  
38 The allocation was done manually on the basis of the product description.  
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weighted average fabric price indices for apparel products produced using different 
combinations of fabric types.
39 
We now separately apply the various equations to the AGOA and MFA trade 
regimes.  
African Growth and Opportunity Act 
Our expectation is that AGOA preferences stimulated US imports from beneficiary 
countries, with relatively high growth in imports of fabric-intensive and low value-
added products. The effects are predicted to be particularly pronounced in LDC 
recipients eligible to use third country fabric. 
Table 5 presents regression results for various specifications of the price 
equation. The first column presents benchmark estimates of the price relationship over 
the period 1996-2004 and is used to evaluate the consistency of the price equation 
with our theoretical priors. Overall, the price model produces results that are 
consistent with theory and other empirical evidence (See Feenstra 1989.  
The dollar price of US clothing imports rise with increases in foreign and US 
competitor’s prices. Import unit values rise with foreign GDP per capita reflecting a 
positive association between income and quality of exports as explained by Hummels 
and Klenow (2005). Applied tariffs reduce the fob price of apparel products with a 
coefficient of -0.60, which is very close to the effect of an equivalent depreciation of 
the dollar.
40 Foreigners therefore absorb 60 percent of tariff increases or depreciation 
either through lower mark-ups (in case of imperfect competition) and/or reduced 
marginal costs (from upward sloping supply curve). Further, rising foreign production 
                                                 
39 See Goldberg and Knetter (1997) on how aggregate production cost indices can bias the exchange-
rate pass-through downwards. The value added deflator is also more aggregated than is desired. 
40 The estimated exchange rate pass-through coefficient of 0.6 falls between Feenstra’s (1989) 
estimates for Trucks (0.63) and Cars (0.71) and more general estimates based on aggregate import data 
(Marazzi et al. 2005, Gopinath and Rigobon 2008).   
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costs result in higher U.S. import prices. US import prices are equally affected by 
increases in foreign fabric costs and value added costs, implying a fabric share 
coefficient of approximately 50 percent.
41 
 
[TABLE 5]  
 
Various diagnostic tests reveal that the aggregate model fails the homogeneity 
test and the hypothesis of symmetric pass-through of the tariff and exchange rate. 
However, far fewer instances of rejection are found in the disaggregated HS4–digit 
level estimates. The disaggregated results and hypotheses tests are presented in Table 
A1 in the appendix. We are therefore reasonably satisfied with our basic price 
equation and proceed with our objective of identifying differences in the fabric-
content of AGOA apparel exports. 
The second column of results extends the base regression by including 
interactions between an AGOA dummy (DAg) and fabric costs and value added prices 
(see rows 9 & 10). The objective of this estimate is to identify the average fabric-
intensity of U.S. imports from AGOA beneficiaries throughout the 1996 to 2004 
period.  
The results indicate that AGOA countries produce relatively fabric-intensive 
clothing products with low value addition. The coefficient on the fabric price (DAg x 
ln(pf)) is positive and significant (0.323), while the coefficient on value added prices 
(DAg x ln(pva)) is significant and negative (-0.389). Therefore, U.S unit values of 
apparel imports from AGOA beneficiaries are far more sensitive to fluctuations in 
fabric prices than apparel imports from the rest of the world. We infer from this result 
                                                 
41 The coefficients on value added and fabric prices are insignificantly different from each other.  
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that AGOA beneficiary exports are relatively fabric-intensive. This outcome is 
consistent with both the effect of the AGOA preferences and the MFA. 
To identify the effect of AGOA preferences on beneficiary exports, we use the 
specification in equation 21 where the time period dummy variable in the interactions 
refers to the 2001 to 2004 period.
42 The relevant results are presented in rows 3 & 4 in 
column 3 of Table 5. These are the coefficients on the difference-in-difference terms 
that measure the change in fabric-intensity of U.S. imports from AGOA beneficiaries 
after 2001 relative to the change in fabric-intensity of imports from the rest of the 
world. Our expectations are that AGOA preferences raised the fabric-intensity of 
imports from beneficiary countries. 
However, contrary to our theoretical predictions, we find no increase in the 
fabric-intensity of apparel exports from 2001 to 2004 in response to the AGOA 
preferences. The coefficients on the interaction terms (D01 x DAg x ln(pf)) in row 3 
and (D01 x DAg x ln(pva)) in row 4 are insignificantly different from zero.  
One reason may be that the above estimates are an average for both LDC 
AGOA and other AGOA countries. Our theory suggests that the effect of AGOA 
preferences on fabric-intensity is particularly pronounced amongst LDC AGOA 
countries who are eligible for the third country fabric provision.  To isolate the 
marginal impact of the third country fabric provision on fabric-content, we include 
additional interactions of ln(pva) and ln(pf) on dummy variables for LDC AGOA 
countries (Dldc) over the full period and over the 2001-04 period. Estimates of this 
relationship are presented in column 4.  The coefficients on the LDC interaction terms 
                                                 
42 Not all countries became eligible to export apparel in 2001. D2001 therefore varies by country and 
time and equals 1 for all years from the time the country becomes eligible to export apparel products. 
The dummy variable is set equal to 1 for the initial year if eligibility occurred within the first 6 months 
of the year.  
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in rows 2 & 3 are interpreted as the marginal impact of AGOA on fabric intensity in 
LDC special rule countries relative to the rest of AGOA beneficiaries.  
We still find no increases in the fabric content of apparel exports by lesser-
developed AGOA countries relative to other AGOA countries or the rest of the world 
from 2001 to 2004. None of the marginal effects for LDC Special Rule countries are 
significantly different from zero.  
Overall, the results suggest that the preferences under AGOA had very little 
impact on the within-product fabric content of apparel exports to the US by recipient 
countries. AGOA beneficiaries, including lesser-developed Special Rule countries, 
were already specialized in fabric intensive products prior to receiving AGOA 
preferences. The impact of AGOA was to make production of these products more 
attractive and they responded by increasing exports of these products, rather then of 
new fabric-intensive products. This is consistent with the decomposition of growth 
analysis in Table 3 which showed that the expansion of exports was overwhelmingly 
along the intensive margin.  
 
Expiration of MFA 
The ending of the MFA presents an additional policy ‘experiment’ to test our theory 
as applied to AGOA beneficiaries. As noted, quotas under the MFA were removed on 
the 1
st January 2005, although some quotas were re-imposed in industrialized 
countries in response to the rapid growth in imports from China.
43 In this section, we 
                                                 
43 We do not take into account the re-imposition of quotas on selected Chinese apparel products from 
late 2005. As shown by Harrigan and Barrow (2010) these contained, but did not reverse the import 
response to the end of the MFA.  
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exploit this break to indentify whether import values, import unit values and the 
fabric-intensity of U.S. apparel imports moved in accordance with our predictions. 
Theory predicts that firms in previously quota restricted countries respond to 
the ending of quotas by downgrading the quality of their apparel exports. In our 
model, this would be revealed by relatively strong growth in imports of low priced 
varieties from previously quota restricted countries that include AGOA beneficiaries. 
Evidence in support of quality downgrading is found by Brambilla et al. (2010) and 
Harrigan and Barrows (2009).  
A second hypothesis derived from our theory, is that, conditional on price, 
quota restricted countries responded to the ending of the MFA by increasing exports 
of fabric-intensive apparel products. In this section, we test these two hypotheses 
focusing on the response by quota restricted countries relative to AGOA beneficiaries.  
Preliminary support for the effect of the MFA on product quality is provided 
in Figure 8 that presents a measure of within-product price differences for selected 
countries relative to Lesotho. These are calculated by aggregating up the log ratio of 
export prices relative to Lesotho using Lesotho export values as weights. Higher 
values reflect the export of more expensive apparel varieties than Lesotho within each 
product line. 
During the MFA period, quota-constrained countries such as China, 
Bangladesh and India exported varieties within each HS 10 digit line that were up to 
twice as expensive as those from Lesotho. The expiration of the MFA, however, saw 
a dramatic decline in the relative price as these countries downgraded the quality of 
their apparel exports: see the relative price of Chinese apparel that fell from 1.95 
times to 90 percent of those from Lesotho in one year. There was a slight rebound  
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from 2006 as new quotas on Chinese apparel exports were imposed, but by 2008 
relative prices had still fallen by over 55 percentage points from 2004.  
 
[FIGURE 8]  
 
The composition of imports from quota constrained countries also shifted 
towards the low priced products exported by Lesotho. Figure 9 presents import 
weighted prices (per square meter equivalent) of apparel imports from each country 
calculated using the product-level median prices for the entire sample and period and 
time varying import values by country as weights. Reductions in the average price, 
reflects  across-product shifts in the composition of apparel exports to the U.S. 
towards lower priced products. 
The shift in composition is most noticeable for China, whose apparel exports 
were initially concentrated in relatively expensive 10-digit apparel products, but then 
fell in 2002 as quotas imposed under Phase I, II and III of the MFA were eliminated 
in response to China’s entry into the WTO. A further shift towards low priced 
products occurred in 2005 after the ending of Phase IV of MFA and by 2008 the 
import weighted median price of Chinese apparel exports was very similar to those of 
Lesotho.  
 
[FIGURE 9] 
 
The trends in these diagrams provide some support for our hypotheses 
regarding the effect of quotas on product prices. We now apply the difference-in-
difference estimation to test for significant changes in the price and fabric-content of 
apparel exports by AGOA recipients   
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Quotas and price levels 
The first objective of this section is to estimate if the expiration of the MFA reduced 
average U.S. import unit values from quota-constrained countries who are predicted 
to have shifted apparel production towards lower priced products. The equation used 
to identify these price effects is the difference-in-difference specification of equation 
20, except that we replace DAg with a dummy variable Dquotacntry for quota 
constrained countries and D01 with a post-2005 dummy variable (D05). Table 6 
presents the results. 
In line with theoretical predictions (and the price trends in Figure 8 and Figure 
9), quota constrained countries responded to the end of the MFA by reducing the 
quality of their apparel exports by shifting towards lower priced varieties and 
products. The average unit value of U.S. apparel imports from the top 4 most quota 
constrained countries declined by 31.9 log points relative to other countries after 2005 
(see row 1 of column 1 of Table 6) (see also Brambilla et al. (2010) and Harrigan and 
Barrows (2009)).
44 This arises from a combination of across-product shifts of imports 
towards lower price products and within-product shifts towards lower priced varieties. 
The expiration of the MFA therefore adversely affected the competitiveness of non-
quota constrained countries such as Lesotho that produced low priced products in 
response to the MFA.  
 
[TABLE 6]  
 
Quotas and fabric-intensity.  
                                                 
44 The decline for the top 30 quota constrained countries is lower at 13.9 percent.  
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We now test for changes in the fabric-intensity of apparel imports in response to the 
expiration of the MFA. Our theory predicts a rise in the fabric-content of exports by 
previously quota constrained countries relative to AGOA beneficiaries and other non-
quota constrained exporters. 
We commence with the simplest difference-in-difference specification to 
identify changes in the fabric-intensity of quota-constrained countries in response to 
the end of the MFA. The specification is similar to that of equation 21, except, as 
above, a post-2005 dummy variable is used and we also include of various 
interactions between Dquotacntry and value added and fabric prices covering the pre 
and post MFA period.  
We are interested in two effects: (i) the change in fabric-intensity of exports of 
the control group (non-quota constrained emerging economies) after January 2005, 
and (ii) the change in fabric-intensity of exports of the quota-constrained group 
relative to the control group. The first effect is given by the interactions between the 
post-MFA dummy (D05) and fabric and value added prices in rows 4 & 5 of Table 6. 
The second effect is given by the triple interaction between D05, Dquotacntry and 
fabric and value added prices in rows 6 & 7.  
The results in rows 4 & 5 in column 2 indicate a decline in the fabric-intensity 
of apparel exports to the U.S from emerging economies after 2005. The coefficient on 
log fabric prices declines by 10.9 log points, while the coefficient on log value added 
prices rises by 9.3 log points. This change is consistent with our theory that predicts 
shifts out of fabric-intensive products by non-quota constrained countries in response 
to the removal of quotas.   
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Our estimates also reveal significant increases in the fabric-intensity of U.S. 
apparel imports from the most quota-restricted countries.
45 This is revealed by the 
significant positive coefficient of 0.217 on the interaction term (D05 x Dquotacntry x 
ln(pf)) in rows 6 & 7 of column 3. Apparel exports from Bangladesh, India, China and 
Indonesia therefore became more responsive to fabric price fluctuations after 2005 
relative to all other emerging economies. We infer from this result that the fabric-
intensity of apparel exports to the U.S. from these previously quota constrained 
countries has risen. 
The next two estimates focus on identifying the MFA effect on prices and 
fabric-intensity for AGOA beneficiaries relative to other non-quota constrained 
emerging economies. We do this by separately including additional triple interactions 
for the AGOA group (see rows 8 & 9 column 3) and the LDC AGOA group (see rows 
10 & 11 column 4).  
The estimates produce interesting results. The data suggest that the expiration 
of the MFA led to a rise in the fabric-intensity of AGOA exports relative to other 
emerging economies. This is revealed by the rising responsiveness of U.S. import 
prices from AGOA recipients to changes in fabric prices relative to the control group. 
If we focus on Lesser-developed beneficiary countries (column 4), we get a similar 
result. 
Clearly AGOA countries have responded differently to other non-quota 
constrained emerging economies. This is precisely what our theory predicts would 
happen under AGOA preferences. We found earlier that AGOA resulted in no 
changes in fabric-intensity of exports by beneficiary countries. Our explanation was 
                                                 
45 There is no significant difference from the control group for the top 30 most quota-restricted 
countries.  
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that these countries were already specialized in fabric-intensive low value-added 
apparel products as a result of the incentives introduced by the MFA quotas.  
With the end of the MFA, China and other quota-constrained countries moved 
into the fabric-intensive products they were previously discouraged from exporting 
under the quotas. This led to increased competition in fabric-intensive products that 
non-quota constrained countries specialized in under the MFA. The response by these 
countries was to reduce the fabric-intensity of their apparel exports. AGOA recipients, 
however, are an exception.  
Why? An explanation based on our theory is that AGOA preferences insulated 
the recipients in the most fabric-intensive products as the effective preferences in 
these products are the greatest. The effect of AGOA on fabric-intensity is only 
revealed in our estimates once MFA is removed as prior to this we had an 
identification problem as both AGOA and MFA encouraged specialization in fabric-
intensive products. 
In sum, the MFA induced AGOA countries to specialize in low value added, 
high fabric-content apparel products. AGOA preferences and particularly the third-
country fabric provision were expected, according to our theory, to compound this 
specialization in low value-added, fabric-intensive varieties and products. We do not 
find evidence of significant changes in the fabric-content of apparel exports in 
response to the AGOA preferences. Rather, the apparel producers in AGOA recipient 
countries responded by increasing exports of existing products.  
The dependence of these exports on the tariff preferences and quota 
restrictions in competing countries made AGOA recipients and other non-constrained 
emerging economies very vulnerable to the ending of the MFA. The elimination of 
quotas (quotas were re-introduced on Chinese exports in later 2005) induced China  
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and other previously quota restricted countries to downgrade product quality and 
increase exports of those products and varieties that AGOA countries were 
specialized in. However, the effect on fabric-content of AGOA recipient exports was 
insulated relative to other countries by the AGOA preferences that grant the greatest 
effective preferences in fabric-intensive products. The AGOA preferences helped 
mitigate the effects of the expiration of the MFA. 
Conclusions 
Lesotho and other Lesser-developed beneficiary countries enjoyed rapid growth in 
their clothing exports to the US as a result of the third-country fabric provision of 
AGOA. Although adversely impacted by the expiration of the MFA and the recession 
in the US, the clothing industries of these least developed African countries have 
clearly benefited from the provisions. But these economies have not enjoyed the more 
dynamic upgrading and spill-over benefits that might have been hoped for. Most of 
the export growth has come in the products that these countries were already 
producing. Success in the US clothing market has also not translated into success in 
other clothing markets or in success in exporting other labor-intensive products. The 
LDBCs have generally remained specialized in a small number of garment categories 
that are particularly favored by the preferences. These typically embody low-value 
added in sewing and are relatively intensive in fabric.  Although the AGOA program 
has operated for a decade, it is unlikely that most of the industry in these poor Sub-
Saharan could survive without the special rule.   
This experience provides important lessons. Trade preferences do have major 
advantages. First, they can offer powerful inducements to beneficiary exporters that 
are financed through foregone tariff revenues by developed countries rather than 
taxpayers in developing countries.  Second, by providing a form of infant industry  
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protection in export rather than domestic markets, they ensure that products have to 
meet the requirements of consumers in advanced economies. And third, since they are 
externally imposed, they do not give rise to domestic rent-seeking. 
The positive response to AGOAs special rule highlights the importance of 
providing exporters with access to inputs at world prices. Requiring exporters to use 
expensive inputs can seriously impede their competitiveness. This is clearly seen in 
the contrast between Lesotho’s prowess in the United States where it is allowed to use 
fabrics that are priced at world prices, with its weak performance in the EU and 
SACU where it is not. The positive response to AGOA highlights the restrictive 
nature of other rules of origin that have been imposed on least developed country 
exports. Allowing LDBCs to use imported fabrics provided powerful effective 
subsidies for clothing exports. This served to compensate producers in poor countries 
for the lower productivity of domestic workers and other institutional and 
infrastructural deficiencies. 
 The fact that the program has operated smoothly without problems relating to 
trade deflection demonstrates the scope for improving the restrictive rules that 
continue to limit the benefits to poor countries from programs such as the EBA 
program of the European Union. Such improvements would create more realistic 
possibilities that the least developed countries could participation in global production 
chains. It would be particularly welcome given the problems faced by these countries 
as a result of the expiration of the MFA.  
In the Doha Round, it is recognized that lower MFN tariffs will result in 
preference erosion. But typically studies have suggested that the effects would not be  
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large.
46 However, if the models that are used to estimate the impact of erosion fail to 
take the third-country fabric provision into account they could seriously 
underestimated the impact on the effective protection provided to the Lesser-
developed AGOA recipients.  
The experience also shows, however, that trade preferences are not a panacea. 
The outcomes associated with the special rule conform to those suggested by theory. 
The special rule distorts decisions on value-addition and fabric use in opposite 
directions, both of which are undesirable. On the one hand, the incentives are most 
powerful in lower quality products that require less value-addition. This may limit the 
dynamic benefits that are hoped for from these preferences by discouraging skills 
development and other forms of quality upgrading. On the other hand it encourages 
the use of more expensive fabrics. This makes it less likely that there will be 
backward linkages into domestic textile industries that are still at rudimentary stages 
of development. 
Preferences are thus an opportunity but not a substitute for more 
comprehensive industrial strategies that involve complementary domestic policies to 
improve private and governmental capabilities. This does not mean that these 
preferences are unimportant, but suggests they are unlikely to be sufficient. In 
addition problems arise when most of the entrepreneurs taking advantage of the 
preferences are foreign, with many other crucial parts of the value chain being 
provided thousands of miles away.  
The experience analyzed in this paper is a case study of the links between 
trade and growth -- a topic that has been the subject of considerable empirical 
                                                 
46 For estimates of the impact of preference erosion see IMF (2003), Olarreaga and Özden (2005), 
Hoekman and Prowse ( 2005) and Grynberg and Silva (2004).  
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investigation. This example highlights the obvious, but often ignored consideration, 
that both trade and growth are quintessentially endogenous variables rather than 
policy instruments and suggests that the reasons for trade are likely to be important in 
the impact on growth. Even if on average trade and growth are associated, and even if 
on average trade may cause growth, the widely used proposition that trade leads to 
growth should not be used as an unconditional forecast. The precise reasons for trade 
and the other domestic conditions and policies that are associated with it, are likely to 
play key roles in the growth impact. In the case of Lesotho and other AGOA countries 
utilizing preferences may lead to more trade but are not a substitute for the more 
difficult challenges of developing more comprehensive development strategies. In 
sum, the slogan of “trade not aid” can be misleading. Trade preferences may be help 
create the conditions for growth, but they are not sufficient  
 
56
56
References 
Alchian, Armen A., and William R. Allen (1964). University Economics. Belmont, 
Calif.: Wadsworth. 
Bennet, Mark (2006). “Lesotho’s Export Textiles & Garment Industry.” In Herbert 
Jauch and Rudolf Traub-Merz (Eds.) The Future of the Textile and Clothing 
Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 
Brambilla, Irene, Amit K. Khandelwal, Peter K. Schott (2010). “China's Experience 
under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) and the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC).” In Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei (editors) China's 
Growing Role in World Trade, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Brenton Paul and Takako Ikezuki (2004). “The Initial and Potential Impact of 
Preferential Access to the U.S. Market under the African Growth and Opportunity 
act,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3262, April 2004. 
Collier, Paul and Anthony J. Venables (2007). “Rethinking Trade Preferences: How 
Africa Can Diversify its Exports,” The World Economy, Vol. 30, No. 8, pp. 1326-
1345. 
Collier, Paul and Jan Willem Gunning (1999). “Explaining African Economic 
Performance,” Journal of Economic Literature, March 1999 37, pp 64 – 111. 
Dixit, Avinash K., and Victor Norman (1980). Theory of International Trade. 
Cambridge Economic Handbooks, Cambridge University Press. 
Dixit, Avinash. K., and Joseph. E. Stiglitz (1977). “Monopolistic Competition and 
Optimum Product Diversity,” American Economic Review, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 
297-308. 
Dornbusch, Rudiger, Stanley Fischer and Paul A. Samuelson. (1977). “Comparative 
advantage, trade and payments in a Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods,” 
American Economic Review, Vol. 65, pp 297-308. 
Falvey, Rodney E (1979). “The Composition of Trade within Import-restricted 
Product Categories,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87, No. 5, Part 1 
(Oct., 1979), pp. 1105-1114. 
Feenstra, Robert C. (1988). “Quality Change under Trade Restraints in Japanese 
Autos,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 103, No. 1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 131-
146.  
Feenstra, Robert C. (2004). Advanced international trade: theory and evidence, 
Princeton University Press. 
FIAS (2006). “The Competitiveness of Regional and Vertical Integration of Lesotho’s 
Garment Industry” IFC and World Bank: Washington DC 2006. 
Frazer, Garth and Johannes Van Biesbroeck (2010). “Trade Growth Under the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 
92, No. 1, pp. 128-144. 
Gereffi, G. (1999). “International trade and industrial upgrading in the clothing 
commodity chain,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 48, pp. 37–70. 
Gibbon, Peter (2003). “The African Growth and Opportunity Act and the Global 
Commodity Chain for Clothing,” World Development Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 1809-
1827.  
 
57
57
Goldberg, Pinelopi .K. and Michael M. Knetter (1997). “Goods prices and exchange 
rates: what have we learned?” Journal of Economic Literature XXXV, pp. 1243–
1272. 
Gopinath, Gita, and Roberto Rigobon (2008). “Sticky Borders,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 123, No. 2, Pages 531-575.  
Grynberg, Roman, and Sacha Silva (2004). Preference-Dependent Economies and 
Multilateral Liberalization: Impacts and Options. London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat. 
Harrigan, James and Geoffrey Barrows (2009). “Testing the Theory of Trade Policy: 
Evidence from the Abrupt End of the Multifiber Arrangement,” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, Vol. 91, No. 2, pp. 282-294. 
Hausmann, Ricardo, Jason Hwang and Dani Rodrik (2007). “What you export 
matters,” Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1-25. 
Hoekman, Bernard, and Susan Prowse (2005). “Policy Response to Preference 
Erosion: From Trade as Aid to Aid for Trade”. Paper Presented at the international 
symposium “Preference Erosion: Impacts and Policy Responses”, Geneva, June 
13-14. 
Hummels, David and Alexandre Skiba (2004). “Shipping the Good Apples out? An 
Empirical Confirmation of the Alchian-Allen Conjecture,” The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 112, No. 6 (Dec., 2004), pp. 1384-1402 
Hummels, David and Peter J. Klenow (2005). “The Variety and Quality of a Nation's 
Exports,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Jun., 2005), pp. 704-
723. 
Hwang, Jason Jaemin (2007) Patterns of Specialization and Economic Growth, Phd 
Thesis, Harvard University. 
IMF (2003). “Financing Losses from Preference Erosion, Note on Issues raised by 
Developing Countries in the Doha Round.” Communication to the WTO from the 
International Monetary Fund, WT/TF/COH/14 February. Prepared by Arvind 
Subramanian. 
Krishna, Kala (1987). “Tariffs versus quotas with endogenous quality,” Journal of 
International Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 23(1-2), pp. 97-112. 
Krugman, Paul R. (1979). “Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and 
international trade,” Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 9, No. 4, 
pp. 469-479. 
Lall, Sanjaya (2005). “FDI, AGOA, and Manufactured Exports From a Land-Locked 
Least Developed African Economy: Lesotho,” Journal of Development Studies, 
August 2005, Vol. 41, No. 6, pp. 998-1022. 
Maloney, Christopher (2006). “All Dressed Up with No Place to Go? Lesotho’s 
Rollercoaster Experience with Apparel,” Harvard Kennedy School MPA/ID 
Second Year Policy Analysis  
Marazzi, M., N. Sheets, R. Vigfusson, J. Faust, J. Gagnon, J. Marquez, R. Martin, T. 
Reeve, and J. Rogers, “Exchange Rate Pass-Through to U.S. Import Prices: Some 
New Evidence,” International Finance Discussion Papers, No. 833, 2005. 
Mattoo, Aadditya; Devesh Roy, and Arvind Subramanian (2003). “The Africa Growth 
and Opportunity Act and its Rules of Origin: Generosity Undermined?” World 
Economy, Vol. 26, No. 6, pp. 829-851.  
 
58
58
Morris, Mike (2006). ‘China’s dominance of global clothing and textiles: is 
preferential trade access an answer for sub-Saharan Africa?,” IDS Bulletin, Vol. 
37, No. 1, pp. 89–97. 
Morris, Mike and Leanne Sedowski (2006). “Report on Government Responses to 
New post-MFA realities in Lesotho,” Report for Institute of Global Dialogue. 
Ng, Francis, and Alexander Yeats. 1996. “Open economies work better: Did Africa’s 
protectionist policies cause its marginalisation in world trade?” World Bank 
Policy Research Working paper No. 1636. World Bank, Washington DC. 
Nouve, Kofi (2005). “Estimating the Effects of AGOA on African Exports Using a 
Dynamic Panel Analysis” World Bank Working Paper July 2005. 
Olarreaga, Marcelo and Çaglar Özden (2005).“AGOA and Apparel: Who Captures 
the Tariff Rent in the Presence of Preferential Market Access?” World Economy, 
Vol. 28, No.1, pp. 63-77. 
Pierce, Justin R. and Peter K. Schott (2009). “Concording U.S. Harmonized System 
Categories over Time,” Center for Economic Studies (CES) Working Paper 09-11. 
Portugal-Perez, Albert (2008). “The costs of rules of origin in Apparel: African 
preferential exports to the United States and the European Union,” UNCTAD 
Policy Issues in International Trade and commodities Study Series No. 39, 
UNCTAD. 
Rolfe, Robert J. and Douglas P. Woodward (2005). “African Apparel Exports, AGOA 
and the Trade Preference Illusion,” Global Economy Journal, Berkley Electronic 
Press, Vol. 5, Issue 3. 
Romalis, John (2007). “Market Access, Openness and Growth” National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper 13048. 
Salm, Andrew, William J. Grant , Thuso J. Green, John R. Haycock and John 
Raimondo (2002). “Lesotho Garment Industry Subsector Study” Report for the 
Government of Lesotho,” study funded by the Department for International 
Development.  
Sandrey Ron, David Maleleka Adelaide Matlanyane, and Dirk Ernst van Seventer 
(2005). “Lesotho: Potential Export Diversification Study”,  (Mimeo) 
Schott, Peter K. (2004). “Across-product Versus Within-product Specialization in 
International Trade,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 2, pp. 
646–677. 
Seidman, Gay W. (2009). “Labouring under an Illusion? Lesotho’s ‘sweat-free’ 
label,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 581 – 598. 
Seyoum, Belay (2007). “Export Performance of developing countries under the Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act,” Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group 
Publishing, Vol. 34, No. 6, pp. 515 – 533. 
Wang, Zhen Kun, and Alan Winters (1998). “Africa’s Role in Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations: Past and Future,” Journal of African Economies Vol. 7, pp. 1-33. 
Wood, Adrian. and Jörg Mayer (2001). “Africa’s Export Structure in a Comparative 
Perspective,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 369-394.  
 
59
59
TABLES 
Table 1: Summary of Apparel Rules of Origin under AGOA 
Description of the rules of origin requirements  Conditions of Access 
1. Apparel made from U.S. yarns or fabric  Unrestricted 
2. Apparel assembled from regional fabric from U.S. or 
African yarn 
Subject to tariff rate quota cap (currently 
6.43675 percent to 2015) 
3. Apparel assembled in a Lesser Developed Country 
using foreign fabric or yarn 
Unrestricted for four years, but extended to 
2012 (cap of 3.5 percent of US imports) 
4. Certain cashmere and merino wool sweaters; Unrestricted  for selected products 
5. Apparel made of yarns and fabrics not produced in 
commercial quantities in the US  Unrestricted 
6. Eligible handloomed, handmade, or folklore articles 
and ethnic printed fabrics; and 
Unrestricted for selected products from Dec 
2006 under AGOA IV 
Note: Unrestricted implies duty-free and quota-free treatment .  
 
Table 2: Products traded (out of approx 1,500 possible products), sorted by 2004 
Eligibility  Country  1996 2000 2004 2008 
Apparel 
eligible 
Mauritius  165 139 135 139 
South  Africa  136 267 318 177 
A
p
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e
l
 
e
l
i
g
i
b
l
e
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Benin  2 2 4 0 
Botswana  14 24 57 18 
Burkina  8 9 9 4 
Cameroon 10  7  14  18 
Cape  Verde  2 4  14 5 
Chad  0 0 1 0 
Ethiopia 9  4  41  79 
Ghana  38 52 63 48 
Kenya 55  45  155  117 
Lesotho  41 60  118 84 
Madagascar  38 175 236 259 
Malawi  2 22 45 25 
Mali  10 10 12 11 
Mozambique  3 0 7 0 
Namibia  0 1  40 2 
Niger  4 4 7 5 
Nigeria  61 47 39 33 
Rwanda  0 0 2 5 
Senegal  31 20 10 16 
Sierra  Leone  2 28 45 54 
Swaziland  21 47  139 86 
Tanzania 4  6  24  16 
Uganda  0 0 9 4 
Zambia  1 1 4 4 
n
o
n
-
a
p
p
a
r
e
l
 
e
l
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i
b
l
e
 
Angola  0 0 0 0 
Burundi  1 1 0 0 
Comoros  1 0 1 0 
Congo  (Brazzaville)  0 0 3 0 
Congo  (Kinshasa)  3 4 1 3 
Djibouti  0 0 0 0 
Gabon  1 1 3 0 
Gambia 6  11  7  9 
Guinea  5 12 13 12 
Guinea-Bissau  0 0 0 3 
Liberia  2 3 2 3 
Sao Tome and 
Principe  1 1 0 0 
Seychelles  0 2 3 6 
Togo  13 4 3 4 
  All  AGOA  countries  323 439 537 465 
Possible 
products      1,548 1,533 1,525 1,515 
Notes: We use the Pierce and Schott (2009) concordance programme to construct a HS 10-digit time-
consistent classification for the full period.  
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Table 3: Decomposition of growth in US apparel imports: Extensive and 
Intensive growth 
  
Contributio
n Intensive 
growth 
Contributi
on 
Extensive 
growth 
Average 
annual 
Growth 
(US$)  
Contributio
n Intensive 
growth 
Contributi
on 
Extensive 
growth 
Average 
annual 
Growth 
(US$) 
Cumulative 
imports 
2004 
   2000-04   2004-08 
A
p
p
a
r
e
l
 
e
l
i
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i
b
l
e
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L
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s
p
e
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a
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r
u
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e
 
Benin 0.00  1.00  0.33    0.00  1.00  -1.00  0.00 
Botswana 0.24  0.76  0.27    -1.56  2.56  -0.06  0.01 
Burkina Faso  -0.02  1.02  0.28    0.00  1.00  -0.49  0.01 
Cameroon 0.00  1.00  0.22    -0.27  1.27  0.21  0.01 
Cape Verde  0.33  0.67  0.36    0.00  1.00  -0.73  0.01 
Chad 0.00  1.00      0.00  1.00  -1.00  0.01 
Ethiopia 0.00  1.00  4.00    0.52  0.48  0.30  0.02 
Ghana 0.02  0.98  1.18    0.95  0.05  -0.41  0.02 
Kenya 0.68  0.32  0.59    0.81  0.19  -0.03  0.18 
Lesotho 0.92  0.08  0.34    0.87  0.13  -0.07  0.44 
Madagascar 0.78  0.22  0.31    0.91  0.09  -0.04  0.62 
Malawi 0.51  0.49  0.38    0.32  0.68  -0.17  0.64 
Mali 1.19  -0.19  -0.17    0.90  0.10  0.37  0.64 
Mozambique 0.00  1.00      0.00  1.00  -1.00  0.64 
Namibia 0.00  1.00  3.69    0.07  0.93  -0.94  0.68 
Niger -0.82  1.82  0.11    0.44  0.56  0.18  0.68 
Nigeria 1.90  -0.90  -0.07    -0.10  1.10  -0.08  0.68 
Rwanda 0.00  1.00      0.00  1.00  0.92  0.68 
Senegal 0.73  0.27  -0.30    0.65  0.35  0.16  0.68 
Sierra Leone  0.40  0.60  0.59    0.19  0.81  -0.39  0.68 
Swaziland 0.57  0.43  0.54    0.63  0.37  -0.09  0.79 
Tanzania 0.24  0.76  1.80    -0.25  1.25  -0.12  0.79 
Uganda 0.00  1.00      -0.04  1.04  -0.44  0.79 
Zambia 0.00  1.00  -0.42    0.00  1.00  -0.52  0.79 
Apparel 
eligible 
Mauritius 0.67  0.33  -0.02   0.94  0.06  -0.18  0.92 
South Africa  -17.67  18.67  0.00    0.80  0.20  -0.40  1.00 
n
o
n
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e
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b
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Burundi 0.00  1.00  -1.00          1.00 
Comoros 0.00  1.00      0.00  1.00  -1.00  1.00 
Congo (DROC)  0.00  1.00  -0.19    0.00  1.00  1.45  1.00 
Congo (ROC)  0.00  1.00      0.00  1.00  -1.00  1.00 
Gabon 0.00  1.00  2.56    0.00  1.00  -1.00  1.00 
Gambia -0.32  1.32  -0.14    0.90  0.10  0.32  1.00 
Guinea -0.02  1.02  -0.42    1.01  -0.01  0.11  1.00 
Guinea-Bissau         0.00  1.00    1.00 
Liberia 0.00  1.00  -0.34    0.00  1.00  0.12  1.00 
Sao Tome & Principe  0.00  1.00  -1.00          1.00 
Seychelles 0.95  0.05  -0.64    0.00  1.00  0.97  1.00 
Togo 0.00  1.00  -0.18    0.00  1.00  0.47  1.00 
                  
All AGOA  0.68  0.32  0.25    0.70  0.30  -0.10   
LDC special rule eligible  0.69  0.31  0.42    0.58  0.42  -0.07   
Other apparel eligible  1.05  -0.05  -0.01    0.87  0.13  -0.25   
Other AGOA  -2.03  3.03  0.04    -0.18  1.18  -0.21   
Note: Mauritius is treated as not eligible to export under LDC special rule, despite being granted 
temporary LDC status from October 2004-September 2005 under the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill of 2004 
(known as AGOA III).   
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Table 4: Price (US$ per dozen) of top 15 Lesotho products in terms of export 
value, ranked largest to smallest, 2004 
HS Description  Lesotho
Other 
lesser-
developed 
AGOA 
Percentiles 
Cumulati
ve trade 
share 
Lesotho  10th 25th Median 75th 90th 
6110202075 
WOMEN’S/GIRL’S OTHER 
PULLOVERS OF COTTON  31 27 26 32 46 99  280  14%
6110202065 
MEN'S/BOYS' OTHER PULLOVERS 
OF COTTON  36 36 24 34 60 110  222  26%
6203424010 
MENS TROUSER BREECHES 
COTTON BLUE DENIM  90 73 48 63 100 191  465  32%
6203424035 
BOYS TROUSER/BREECHES, 
COTTON, BLUE DENIM.  68 66 42 54 68 98  269  37%
6204624010 
WOMENS TROUSERS/BREECHES, 
COTTON, BLUE DENIM.  87 71 52 76 92 199  449  42%
6204624020 
WOMENS TROUSERS/BREECHES 
OTHER COTTON, NOT KNIT  71 58 39 65 93 232  384  45%
6110303055 
WOMEN’S/GIRL’S OTHER 
SWEATERS, MANMADE FIBERS  36 46 34 43 57 120  406  49%
6204624040 
GIRLS TROUSER COT BLUE DNM NT 
IMP PLYSUIT PT,N KT  70 66 43 59 73 100  470  52%
6110303050 
MEN'S/BOYS'OTHER SWEATERS, 
MANMADE FIBERS, KNIT  35 52 30 41 68 163  287  56%
6110202040 
MEN'S/BOYS' SWEATSHIRTS, OF 
COTTON 60 56 41 60 77 170  306  58%
6104632011 
WOMEN'S TROUSERS AND 
BREECHES, SYNTHETIC FIBERS  50 46 28 43 60 198  409  61%
6203424045 BOYS TROUSER ETC OT COTTON   70 49 26 47 67 93  243  63%
6203424060 
BOYS SHORTS COTTON NOT 
PLAYSUIT PARTS, NOT KNIT  52 53 25 39 55 84  207  65%
6203424050 MENS SHORTS OF COTTON  69 53 27 48 74 148  288  67%
6204624055 WOMENS SHORTS OF COTTON  63 49 34 52 67 113  337  69%
              
   All products exported by Lesotho  37 59 22 33 60 122  299  
Notes: The mean price for Other AGOA is the exponent of the mean log price.  
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Table 5: Marginal impact of AGOA preferences on fabric-intensity in 
beneficiary countries 
 Country  sample  All  All  All  All 
 
 Base 
AGOA fabric-
intensity AGOA 
Marginal LDC 
AGOA 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Marginal impact of AGOA on fabric-intensity    
  LDC AGOA countries relative to other AGOA
1    D01 x Dldc x ln(pf)        0.067 
2    D01 x Dldc x ln(pva)        -0.083 
  AGOA countries relative to control
3    D01 x DAg x ln(pf)      -0.114 -0.175 
4    D01 x DAg x ln(pva)      0.113 0.186 
 Other  coefficients  
5 ln(pf)  0.272*** 0.268*** 0.316*** 0.315*** 
6 ln(pva)  0.237*** 0.252*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 
7   Dldc x ln(pf)  -0.049 
8   Dldc x ln(pva)  0.144 
9   DAg x ln(pf)  0.323*** 0.405*** 0.446** 
10   DAg x ln(pva)  -0.389*** -0.423*** -0.537** 
11    D01 x ln(pf)  0.099*** 0.099*** 
12    D01 x ln(pva)  -0.104*** -0.104*** 
13    D01 x Dldc  0.034 
14    D01 x DAg  -0.063 -0.092 
15 ln(GDP/capita),  PPP  0.126*** 0.115*** 0.124*** 0.122*** 
16 ln(e)  -0.538*** -0.548*** -0.547*** -0.546*** 
17 ln(Pcompete)  0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
18 ln(US  ppi)  0.135 0.131*** 0.109 0.11 
19 ln(1+t)  -0.600*** -0.637*** -0.684*** -0.689*** 
      
 N  255231 255231 255231 255231 
 F  90.9 81.61 67.2 54.8 
 
Fixed effects 
country/pro
duct 
country/produ
ct country/product country/product 
   year  year  year  year 
Notes: Estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01  
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Table 6: Marginal impact of the ending of the MFA on import unit values and 
fabric-intensity in Apparel eligible AGOA beneficiaries 
    Base price  Base fabric  AGOA  LDC Agoa 
  Country  sample  Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Impact of ending of MFA on U.S. import prices    
1 
Quota constrained relative to control (D05 
x Dquotacntry)  -0.319*** -0.580*** -0.567*** -0.573*** 
2  AGOA relative to control (D05 x DAg)     0.422***   
3 
LDC AGOA relative to other AGOA (D05 
x Dldc)       0.111 
  Marginal impact of ending of MFA on fabric-intensity    
  Control  group      
4  D05 x ln(pf)   -0.107***  -0.087***  -0.098*** 
5  D05 x ln(pva)   0.093***  0.073**  0.084*** 
  Quota-constrained group relative to control group       
6     D05 x Dquotacntry x ln(pf)   0.217***  0.219***  0.209*** 
7     D05 x Dquotacntry x ln(pva)   -0.112  -0.112  -0.104 
  AGOA countries relative to control group      
8     D05 x DAg x ln(pf)     0.294***   
9     D05 x DAg x ln(pva)     -0.317***   
  LDC AGOA countries relative to other AGOA       
10     D05 x Dldc x ln(pf)       0.273** 
11     D05 x Dldc x ln(pva)       -0.260** 
 Other  variables      
12 ln(pf)  0.619*** 0.443*** 0.468*** 0.430*** 
13 ln(pva)  0.381*** 0.288*** 0.332*** 0.320*** 
14   Dquotacntry x ln(pf)   0.599***  0.631***  0.628*** 
15   Dquotacntry x ln(pva)   -0.898***  -0.938***  -0.917*** 
16   DAg x ln(pf)     0.432***   
17   DAg x ln(pva)     -0.324***   
18   Dldc x ln(pf)       0.373*** 
19   Dldc x ln(pva)       -0.297*** 
20 ln(GDP/capita),  PPP  0.152*** 0.578*** 0.580*** 0.534*** 
21 ln(e)  -1.141*** -0.886*** -0.980*** -0.918*** 
22 ln(Pcompete) 0.028**  0.038***  0.037***  0.038*** 
23 ln(US ppi)  0.216* 0.230* 0.234* 0.220* 
24 ln(1+t)  -0.637*** -0.681*** -0.661*** -0.701*** 
        
  N  102208 102208 102208 102208 
  F  168 131 108 106 
 Fixed  effects 
country/prod
uct 
country/prod
uct 
country/prod
uct 
country/prod
uct 
      year  year  year  year 
Notes: Estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: US apparel imports from AGOA countries according to import 
program 
Apparel imports from AGOA countries according to Import Programme (bill SME)
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Figure 2: US imports from AGOA countries 
U.S. imports of clothing and textiles for selected AGOA recipients
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Figure 3: Apparel exports to the EU 15, selected AGOA countries 
Exports of HS61 & 62 to EU15 
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Notes: Own calculations using data from Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb ) 
 
Figure 4: Lesotho apparel exports to US according to Chinese quota fill rates 
 
AGOA apparel exports to US according to binding and non-binding 2003 Chinese 
quota categories 
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Notes: Quota fill rates are obtained from OTEXA ((http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/). Quotas on product lines 
are assumed binding if the 2003 Chinese fill rate is greater than or equal to 90%.  
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Figure 5: The effect of tariff preferences on incentive to export fabric-intensive 
products 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Unit values and level of development: Top Apparel product exported 
by Lesotho in 2004 (Women’s or girls’ other pullovers of cotton, knitted). 
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Notes: Triangles are AGOA countries eligible to export apparel. Square blocks reflect the top quota 
restricted countries from 1984-2004 as identified by Brambilla et al. (2010) 
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Figure 7: Fabric price indices 
Fabric price indices (based on world exports & imports from UNComtrade)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Clothing Cotton fabric Man-made fabric
Silk fabric Wool fabric
 
Notes: Based on Tornqvist price index constructed using hs 6-digit unit values  obtained from 
UnComtrade trade data. Hs 6-digit product lines for fabric (HS (50 - silk, 51-wool, fine animal hair, 52-
cotton, 54-man made fiber, 55 - man-made staple).  
 
Figure 8: Import weighted average price relative to Lesotho 
Import weighted average price relative to Lesotho (using Lesotho exports as weights)
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Note: The import weighted average price for country c is calculated as     
iLt w
iLt ict ct p p p  where 
wiLt is the share of product i in Lesotho’s apparel exports to the US, PiLT is the price of Lesotho exports 
and Pict is the price of the comparator country apparel exports.   
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Figure 9: Structural shifts in the composition of US apparel imports 
Structural shifts in the composition of imports, import weighted US average 
unit value ($)  per SME 
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Note: The import weighted average price for country c is calculated as    i ict ct p m psme  where  i p  is 
the median price of product i over the entire period and mict is the share of i in country c’s apparel 
exports to the US.  
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Table A1: Price equation estimates by 4-digit HS level 
   Coefficients  
Hypothesis tests (p-
value)
Hs4 
code  Description 
ln(GDP 
worker) ln(pf) ln(pva) ln(e)
ln(Pcomp
ete) ln(US  ppi) ln(1+t)N F r 2
HOD 
1 1+2=2
Erate=
tariff
6101 men's or boys' overcoats etc, knit or crochet  -0.186 0.329** 0.217*** -0.660*** 0.062  -0.439 0.873** 2890 7.19 0.024 0.169 0.072 0.003
6102 women's or girls' overcoats etc, knit or crochet  -0.530*** 0.199 0.420*** -0.704*** 0.107**  -0.546 0.047 3833 14.3 0.035 0.719 0.048 0.397
6103 men's or boys' suits, ensembles etc, knit or croch  -0.282*** 0.358*** 0.326*** -0.672*** 0.062**  0.774*** -1.265*** 8136 17.6 0.024 0.122 0.714 0.002
6104 women's or girls' suits, ensemb etc, knit or croch  -0.319*** 0.406*** 0.358*** -0.812*** 0.070***  1.444*** -0.244 24243 76.2 0.030 0.001 0.011 0.772
6105 men's or boys' shirts, knitted or crocheted  0.071 0.469*** 0.331*** -0.678*** 0.150** 0.649* -0.293 4272 14.8 0.035 0.118 0.001 0.928
6106 women's or girls' blouses & shirts, knit or croch  -0.149 0.231** 0.255*** -0.555*** 0.161***  0.539 -0.557* 5332 15.1 0.027 0.651 0.114 0.731
6107 men's or boys' underpants, pjs, etc, knit or croch  -0.384 0.752** -0.13 -1.377*** 0.262**  0.274 1.029 2321 3.96 0.018 0.902 0.008 0.658
6108 women's or girls' slips, pjs, etc, knit or crochet  -0.454*** 0.439*** 0.370*** -0.912*** 0.064*  0.238 -1.884*** 10262 33.7 0.033 0.794 0.003 0.000
6109 t-shirts, singlets, tank tops etc, knit or crochet  -0.105* 0.225*** 0.273*** -0.632*** 0.023  0.780*** 0.042 14877 39.1 0.025 0.067 0.000 0.027
6110 sweaters, pullovers, vests etc, knit or crocheted  -0.179*** 0.574*** 0.298*** -0.819*** 0.056***  0.406** -0.423*** 29316 98.4 0.031 0.041 0.003 0.100
6111 babies' garments & accessories, knit or crocheted  -0.299 0.241 0.381*** -0.829*** 0.229***  1.329** 1.139 5254 20.8 0.048 0.054 0.101 0.082
6112 track suits, ski-suits & swimwear, knit or crochet  -0.442*** 0.736*** 0.286*** -1.101*** 0.079**  1.894*** -0.367 6478 24.4 0.033 0.004 0.067 0.239
6113 garments, knit etc, coated etc rubber, plastic etc  0.037 1.015*** -0.034 -1.180*** 0.076  0.989 4.128* 2653 8.76 0.030 0.162 0.036 0.099
6114 garments nesoi, knitted or crocheted  -0.375*** 0.647*** 0.279*** -1.028*** 0.016  -0.181 -0.43 9940 33.5 0.031 0.484 0.004 0.114
6115 pantyhose, socks & other hosiery, knit or crochet  -0.348** 0.151* 0.609*** -0.718*** 0.047  1.775** -0.564 5535 18 0.030 0.036 0.379 0.728
6116 gloves, mittens and mitts, knitted or crocheted  -0.677*** 0.689*** 0.441*** -1.108*** -0.054  0.725 -1.525*** 5314 21.5 0.032 0.132 0.779 0.005
6117 made-up clothing access nesoi. parts etc. knit etc  -0.561*** 0.367** 0.392*** -0.678*** 0.096***  3.312*** -0.866 5824 15.7 0.023 0.000 0.304 0.435
6201 men's or boys' overcoats, cloaks etc, not knit etc  0.032 0.343*** 0.351*** -0.638*** 0.068**  -0.403 -0.225 12265 34.8 0.026 0.089 0.050 0.556
6202 women's or girls' overcoats etc, not knit or croch  -0.043 0.410*** 0.354*** -0.788*** 0.013  -0.509 -0.438** 14450 57 0.035 0.294 0.183 0.296
6203 men's or boys' suits, ensembles etc, not knit etc  0.057 0.238*** 0.358*** -0.573*** 0.100***  0.698*** -0.579*** 22945 72.3 0.030 0.026 0.199 0.398
6204 women's or girls' suits, ensemb etc, not knit etc  -0.009 0.447*** 0.368*** -0.822*** 0.044***  0.797*** -0.504*** 50694 245 0.044 0.019 0.510 0.043
6205 men's or boys' shirts, not knitted or crocheted  0.113 0.368*** 0.319*** -0.641*** -0.035 0.924*** -0.718*** 6467 19.2 0.029 0.087 0.168 0.198
6206 women's or girls' blouses, shirts etc not knit etc  0.028 0.453*** 0.205*** -0.704*** 0.052*  0.989*** -0.687*** 7965 38.3 0.042 0.037 0.085 0.119
6207 men's or boys' undershirts etc, not knit or croch  -0.068 0.352 0.263 -0.987*** -0.071  0.628 -2.315 2337 4.27 0.024 0.893 0.105 0.249
6208 women's or girls' slips etc, not knit or crochet  -0.095 0.306*** 0.195*** -0.577*** 0.116***  -0.463 -1.424*** 7748 15.5 0.021 0.064 0.077 0.001
6209 babies' garments & accessories, not knit or croch  -0.358** 0.602*** 0.238** -1.258*** -0.084  0.923 -0.923 3786 19.9 0.054 0.329 0.002 0.118
6210 garments, of felt etc, or fabric impregnated etc  -0.299*** 0.429*** 0.149** -0.577*** -0.052  -0.093 -0.137 7067 5.03 0.007 0.315 0.978 0.561
6211 track suits, ski-suits & swimwear, not knit etc  -0.046 0.386*** 0.289*** -0.674*** 0.079***  0.582*** 0.555** 28191 54.1 0.018 0.144 0.937 0.001
6212 bras, girdles, garters etc., knitted etc or not  -0.117 0.509*** 0.390*** -0.854*** -0.049  1.165* -1.159** 5872 21.8 0.032 0.101 0.382 0.072
6213 handkerchiefs  -0.758** 0.147 0.053 -1.064*** -0.044  11.178*** 1.781 1049 4.38 0.046 0.001 0.001 0.428
6214 shawls, scarves, mufflers, mantillas, veils etc.  -0.097 -0.04 0.208* -0.099 0.156* 2.429 -0.055 3625 2.66 0.007 0.246 0.448 0.162
6215 ties, bow ties & cravats, not knitted or crocheted  -0.817*** -0.157 0.733*** -0.472*** 0.126** 0.823 0.318 1974 6.86 0.031 0.519 0.247 0.28470 
 
  70
6216 gloves, mittens and mitts, not knit or crocheted  -0.027 0.897*** 0.232* -0.945*** -0.033  -1.059 -0.737 2991 3.62 0.013 0.305 0.110 0.366
6217 made-up clothing access nesoi, garment etc parts nesoi  -0.571** 0.102 0.323** -0.627*** -0.006  8.474*** -0.019 4782 9.05 0.020 0.000 0.034 0.652
6406 parts of footwear: insoles etc: gaitors etc, parts  -1.000** -0.699 0.713** -0.06 -0.012  4.351** 1.158 691 2.79 0.045 0.045 0.900 0.558
6501 hat forms/bodies, hoods, plateaux & manchons of felt  0.359 1.500* -0.629 -0.838 -0.054  1.703 -2.434 381 0.885 0.027 0.401 0.893 0.528
6502 hat shapes, plaited or assembled strips any material  -0.243 0.656 -0.117 -0.75 0.136*  3.266* -0.79 671 3.31 0.043 0.074 0.382 0.657
6503 felt hats & other felt headgear from heading 6501  0.498 2.189 -0.012 -2.288** -0.046  1.255 -81.49*** 243 9.51 0.347 0.535 0.657 0.000
6504 hats & other headgear,plaitd/assmbld strips any material  -0.099 0.126 0.214 -0.595** 0.228**  0.754 -0.658* 1653 4.05 0.019 0.683 0.062 0.557
6505 hats & headgear, knit etc, lace, etc in pc, hr net  -0.300*** 0.545*** 0.278*** -0.817*** 0.151***  0.554** -1.285** 9802 24.2 0.027 0.044 0.867 0.039
Note: Year fixed effects are not included as the fabric costs do not vary across products for some of the HS 4-digit groups. Estimates are robust to heteroscekasticity.  
 
Overall, the coefficients are broadly consistent with expectations. In most sectors the coefficient on fabric prices is positive and ranges from 0.23 
to just over 1. Similarly, the coefficients on value added prices and the exchange rate are mostly of the correct sign. The estimates for Headgear 
(HS 64) and Footwear (HS 65) products are poor, but is likely that the fabric costs indices do not adequately reflect the inputs used in the 
production of these products. For example, HS 6406 covers Parts of Footwear; Removable In-Soles, Heel Cushions And Similar Articles; 
Gaiters, Leggings etc. HS65 covers headgear products often comprising of felt, strips of any material, lace, etc. These products also make up a 
very small proportion of AGAO country exports.  Most estimates fail to reject the homogeneity and symmetric pass-through (both the tariffs and 
exchange rate & exchange rate and production costs) hypotheses. Each hypothesis is rejected at most 12 times (out of 40).  